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ABSTRACT
The evidence was conclusive: The owner of a gallery held
photographs of the stolen bronze statue; the digital records of the
alarm system showed that the system had been disconnected at
03:16; a moment later, the digital video showed a masked figure
quickly traverse the corridor into the exhibition hall – and the
bludgeoned guard filled in the missing details. The court held no
doubt. It ordered the insurance company to pay the insurance
proceeds to the gallery owner. There was only one flaw in the
outcome of the proceeding, one that escaped everyone’s notice:
There was no bronze statue. It had never existed. In fact, no
robbery had occurred. All of the electronic evidence was forged, but
it was flawless. No one would have guessed that the image was
computer-generated; that the system records had been carefully
doctored; and that the video had been edited using a sophisticated
algorithm. The guard, who had been bribed to lie, lent an air of
authenticity to the evidence. The trial could have gone no other
way.
This study intends to shine a spotlight on the difficulty described by the above case.
In doing so, the study will delve into the evidentiary dilemmas that are gradually
increasing as technology develops, relating to the possibility, and relative ease, of
fabricating images that can pass as authentic evidence, and that the human eye
cannot distinguish from the genuine article. This article will explore the current
legal situation, and in particular, the unique characteristics of Israeli law (and the
State of Israel in general), which suffers from an overload of legal proceedings as a

result of an abundance of lawyers and a shortage of judges and law enforcement
officers, in light of the legal challenges associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.1
In the first section, we will present the current situation related to technology,
including the practical ease of forging images in the modern era. This technological
review will examine the past situation, the developments that have bridged this
gap, and particularly how easy it is today to submit an image that appears
authentic despite being completely fabricated.
In the second section, we will present the current situation concerning evidence
law. We will review classical evidence law, which champions the doctrine of
accepting the “best evidence” exclusively; and compare this to modern evidence
laws, which seek to persevere through the Information Age by championing the
accrual of as wide an expanse of evidence as possible.
The third section will examine the inherent difficulty presented by the ease of
forging images, as seen through the lens of the probative rules of modern evidence
law, and how this issue is likely to be exacerbated by the cognitive biases to which
courts may be susceptible that relate to digital evidence.
The fourth section will examine the unique characteristics of Israeli law, and,
effectively, any adversarial legal system suffering from an overload of legal
proceedings and illustrate the current state of overload plaguing the State of Israel,
as well as other legal systems.
The fifth section will propose a solution to the problem based on the existing law
and case law, and illustrate how this solution may mitigate concerns of the
potential for defrauding the courts, while at the same time incentivizing the
relevant parties to conduct themselves more prudently.
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JUDICIAL ERRORS: FAKE IMAGING AND THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE
GUY ALON, AZMI HAIDER & HAGIT HEL-OR
I. FAKE IMAGING
Given the increased use of the internet, and specifically social media, our
major connection to events happening in the world is the visual content and
evidence obtained through these platforms.2 Visual inputs have a much stronger
effect, leave a stronger impression and raise more intense perception than any
other human sense.3 Thus, visual media serves as the most convincing source of
evidence, especially compared to audio or written sources. This underscores the
importance of ensuring the reliability of visual media, particularly when consumed
en masse by the general public. Unfortunately, the ever-growing advancements in
the fields of computer imaging and graphics have made image tampering and
forgery both highly accessible and persuasive, rendering it basically impossible for
the naked eye to detect in an image or video.4 This has enabled the rise of fake
news, by allowing the casual editing of political speeches, forging visual data that
may serve as evidence in court cases, and many more examples, any one of which
might have disastrous consequences if not detected. Therefore, detecting forgery in
visual media is vital. Due to the difficulty in visually detecting tampering and
forgery in visual media, computational tools based on computer vision and artificial
intelligence (AI) have been recruited.
For many years, classical methods of image and video forgery involved
manually editing the data or using basic image processing tools such as image color
manipulation and image filtering. In 2012, a new revolutionary approach to
computation was presented,5 which changed the field of digital forgery and its
detection. The revolutionary data driven machine learning approaches based on
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) are not only capable of detecting image forgery
at a higher level than ever before; they have redefined image forgery itself. Rather
than tampering with existing images, the most advanced forgery techniques are
engaged in synthesizing non-existing images using specialized neural networks,
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). Since then, neural networks,
specifically GANs,5 are the major threat presented in visual data forgery. Image
forgery and its detection, similar to cyber security attacks and defenses, form a
continuous cat-and-mouse game. Attacks (forgery) rely on understanding the
mechanisms of defenses used (forgery detection), and attempting to fool them. Once
successfully breached, an update of the defenses usually follows, until a new type
of attack is met, and so on and so forth. Numerous new methods of image forgery

2 E.g., television news and social media sites dedicated to visual data (Instagram, SnapChat,
YouTube, etc.).
3 Fabian Hutmacher, Why Is There So Much More Research on Vision Than on Any Other
Sensory
Modality?,
FRONTIERS
IN
PSYCHOL.
(Oct.
10,
2019),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02246/full; DAVID E. KATZ, THE WORLD
OF TOUCH (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum); Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence, The Cognitive and Neural
Correlates of Tactile Memory, 135 PSYCHOL. BULL. 380, 380–406 (2009).
4 See e.g., Generative Adversarial Networks, infra, § B(1).
5 Ian Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial Nets. Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, 27 NEURIPS 1 (2014); See Ian Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial
Networks, 63 COMM. OF THE ACM, 139, 139–44 (2020).
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are created every year, followed by papers presenting methods to detect these
forgeries. It is a never-ending battle.
In this article we provide an overview of digital forgery of visual media
(images and videos), from classical methods used in low-cost image editing software
such as Photoshop, Lightroom (both developed by Adobe)6 and others, to more
revolutionary techniques based on Machine Learning (ML) and algorithms within
the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Additionally, we will discuss counter
methods to detect forgeries and tampering of visual data.
In this section, we divide digital image forgery and its detection into two
parts. The first part describes classical image forgery and detection, both the active
and the passive approaches. The second part introduces modern image forgery and
its detection, i.e., the AI-based image forgery and detection, which are mostly data
driven approaches. We illustrate the revolution of neural networks and show that
today, rather than tampering with existing images, the most advanced forgery
techniques synthesize non-existing images using GANs.
A. Classical Image Forgery and its Detection
Prior to the machine learning revolution in 2012, algorithms for image
tampering relied on image processing algorithms, which in turn rely on
mathematical algorithms. These could have been implemented using computer
programs or manually, via image and video processing apps (e.g., Photoshop etc.).
This fact is important because once a mathematical operation is understood, it is
more easily inverted, meaning that its effect in an image could be detected to some
degree.
Image forgery is divided into two categories:7 active algorithms and passive
algorithms. Active approaches refer to algorithms implemented at the time of
image acquisition, while passive approaches refer to manipulations of an image
after acquisition, with no prior knowledge about the source camera pipeline.

Figure 1: Digital Image Forgery Categories8

See ADOBE, https://www.adobe.com/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
Ananga Thapaliya et al., DIGITAL IMAGE FORGERY 2 (2020), http://ceur-ws.org/Vol2525/ITTCS-19_paper_36.pdf
8 Id. at 3.
6
7
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1. Digital Signatures (Active Forgery)
The image acquisition process within cameras always leaves an
unintentional trace in the resulting image due to image noise, radial distortion,
vignetting, chromatic aberration, and other interferences.9 Since cameras differ in
their pipelines, hardware, and designs, these traces differ among different camera
models. These traces are termed the signature and can be used as an identifier of
the source camera which captured the image. Additionally, corruption,
inconsistency, or multiplicity of the signature within an image can indicate image
tampering and forgery, making these a basis for forgery detection.10
2. Digital Watermarking (Active Forgery)
Another form of image signature is actively introduced into the image.
During the acquisition of an image, the camera creates a hidden message inside
the image, called a watermark 11 The watermark often encodes information about
the source camera, ownership, copyright information and more. The watermark
can later be tested as a form of forgery detection. The success of forgery in this
case depends on the ability of the tampering to maintain the integrity of the
watermark.
3. Copy-Move Forgery (Passive Forgery)
Passive forgery refers to image tampering after the image has been
acquired. The most common form of forgery is copying and pasting parts within the
same image. Forgery detection of this nature has been widely researched, and a
variety of approaches have been suggested among which are the block-based
methods12 and key point-based methods.13
In block-based techniques, the image or video is divided into square regions
or blocks and features representing the data in each block are extracted. Then,
blocks with similar features are sought. Since image statistics are such that every
block should be distinct, two or more blocks that are found to be very similar are a
strong indication of copy-paste forgery. Key point-based methods work on the
image as a whole. Local key features of the image are extracted, such as corners
and edges using various extraction methods such as SIFT14, SURF,15 and others.
Comparison is then performed between extracted features and, as in the
9 Kai San Choi, Edmund Y. Lam, & K. K. Y. Wong, Automatic Source Camera Identification
Using the Intrinsic Lens Radial Distortion, 14 OPTICS EXPRESS 11551, 11551–65 (2006); Siwei
Lyu, Estimating Vignetting Function From a Single Image for Image Authentication, 2010 12TH
ACM WORKSHOP ON MULTIMEDIA AND SEC. 3; Micah K. Johnson & Hany Farid, Exposing Digital
Forgeries Through Chromatic Aberration, 2006 8TH ACM WORKSHOP ON MULTIMEDIA AND SEC.
48.
10 Noa Privman-Horesh, Azmi Haider, & Hagit Hel-Or, Forgery Detection in 3D-Sensor
Images, 2018 IEEE/CVF INT’L CONF. ON COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN RECOG.WORKSHOPS
1642, 1643–46. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8575367&tag=1.
11 INGEMAR COX, ET. AL., DIGITAL WATERMARKING AND STEGANOGRAPHY (Morgan Kaufmann
Publishers Inc., 2d ed. 2007).
12 E.g., Id. at 6, 27.
13 E.g., Id. at 28, 32.
14 David G. Lowe, Distinctive Image Features from Scale-Invariant Keypoints, 1 INT’L J.
COMP. VISION 1, 2 (2004).
15 Herbert Bay, Tinne Tuytelaars, & Luc Van Gool, SURF: Speeded Up Robust Features, 2006
EUR. CONF. ON COMPUTER VISION 404 (2006).
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block-based method, features found to be very similar are a strong indication of
copy-paste forgery.16
An example of a forged image using copy-paste is shown in Figure 2 (the
image appeared in The New York Times in July 2008).17 The copied regions are
clearly seen.

Figure 2: The marked areas are repetitions, copied and pasted.18
4. Image Splicing (Passive Forgery)
Image splicing is the composition of an image from two (or more) images.
Methods for detecting this kind of forgery must identify the tampering without
access to the source images that created the forgery. Thus, these methods must
determine forgery by discovering inconsistencies between different regions of the
image. A survey19 examining the popular methods of image splicing detection
divides the methods into several categories. Pixel-based methods test for continuity
across adjacent pixels in the image to determine if an unnatural edge has been
created by the splicing. Camera-based methods exploit the camera’s inherent
information, such as noise and the camera's color filter arrays, to determine if there
are different camera signatures in different parts of the image. Format-based
methods rely on the fact that cameras use different compression parameters that
leave artifacts in the image. Inconsistencies in these traces across different regions
in the image may indicate splice forgery. Noise-based methods test noise statistics
within regions of the image, to find inconsistencies. Unique parameters-based
methods test image regions for consistency of image parameters such as blurriness,
resolution, change in tone, etc. The survey also describes the different techniques
of forgery detection of spliced images and discusses their merits and demerits. An
example of a spliced image is shown in Figure 3. The image on the right below is
the composition of the left image, as background, and a crop of the middle image
as foreground.
16 Hailing Huang, Weiqiang Guo & Yu Zhang, Detection of Copy-Move Forgery in Digital
Images Using SIFT Algorithm, 2008 IEEE PAC.-ASIA WORKSHOP ON COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIG.
AND INDUS. APPLIC. 272, 272–74 (2008).
17 Badal Soni et al., CMFD: A Detailed Review of Block Based and Key Feature-Based
Techniques in Image Copy-Move Forgery Detection, 12 IET IMAGE PROCESSING 167 (2017).
18 Mike Nizza & Patrick J. Lyons, In an Iranian Image, a Missile Too Many, N. Y. TIMES:
THE LEDE (July 10, 2008, 9:16 AM), https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/in-an-iranianimage-a-missile-too-many/?scp=1&sq=iran%20missile%20photo%20the%20lede&st=cse.
19 Jinwei Wang & Yangyang Li, Splicing Image and Its Localization: A Survey, 1 J. INFO.
HIDING AND PRIVACY PROT. 77 (2019).
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Figure 3: Right image is a spliced image using the left image as background and
part of the middle image as foreground.20
5. Image Retouching (Passive Forgery)
Image retouching is the most popular type of image forgery used in photo
editing software.21 It involves applying filters to regions in an image to make it
more visually appealing, such as blurring or removing blemishes, color changing,
light enhancement, warping, noise cleaning, and many other edits. Figure 4 shows
an example. The original image is on the left and the retouched image is on the
right.22 Although some might not consider this as forgery per se, it is nonetheless
image tampering.

20 Pius
Lee, Full Sphynx Profile Pyramid Giza Egypt, ADOBE STOCK IMAGES,
https://stock.adobe.com/images/Full-Sphynx-Profile-Pyramid-GizaEgypt/41629831?as_campaign=TinEye&as_content=tineye_match&epi1=41629831&tduid=0d82
6898d24040ee8f3b792b75f670f6&as_channel=affiliate&as_campclass=redirect&as_source=arva
to (last visited Mar. 21, 2022); Peggy Marco, Photographer Taking Photos Camera Reporter Man,
PIXABAY (Jan. 8, 2016), https://pixabay.com/photos/photographer-taking-photos-camera1124760/; Author created the picture in the bottom row through splicing the two pictures from
the two aforementioned sources in this note.
21 For example using Photoshop, Lightroom, Skylum Luminar and many other programs.
22 FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/photos/prairiekittin/5179916951 (last visited Nov. 24,
2021).
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Figure 4: Left image is the original. Right image is the retouched image.23
B. Modern Forgery: AI-Based Image Forgery and Detection
In the previous section we reviewed forgery methods (and their detection)
that were popular until the introduction of the revolutionary Machine Learning
approaches in 2012. The classic methods implemented forgery by using standard
image processing operations and filters, or by manually manipulating the image.
To determine whether an image is forged or not, careful computations must be
performed to extract relevant image features. Typically, these computations
require some knowledge (or a good guess) of the parameters used to create the
forgery. This may be very challenging, especially when complicated image
manipulations have been performed. The introduction of novel machine-learning
algorithms allows users to develop techniques that generate filters or operations
which automatically detect forgery based on many examples of forged and original
images.
Machine Learning (ML) is a class of algorithms that are developed based
on examples. Rather than writing a program based on a set of rules (e.g., if you find
a watermark in an image, test its integrity, and if it is not whole, output that the
image has been tampered with), the ML algorithms are programs whose
parameters are tuned by feeding them many examples of inputs and their expected
outputs. For example, the inputs may be images and their associated output a
label: “original” or “forged.” The goal of ML, and specifically Artificial Neural
Networks (ANN), is to create a program, often termed a model or network, that is
based on a sequence of tunable filters being applied to the input (image).
The filter parameters are tuned according to the dataset of input-output
pairs. The process of repeatedly changing the parameters in the model is called the
training process. In each step, an input image is given to the model, the current
filters are applied to it, and an output is produced by the model. This output is
compared to the desired output as defined by the input-output pair, and a loss score
is computed as the difference between the desired output and that produced by the
model. Based on the loss score, the filters of the model are tuned, i.e., the model’s
parameters are changed to increase the similarity between the model's output and

23

Id.
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the desired one. In the ideal case, after going through the entire training data, the
loss will be close to zero. This process is termed Model Training (or ANN Training).
This type of learning is called Supervised Learning.24
Following training, the model (ANN) can now be used to process new data.
Given a new input (image), the model produces an appropriate output, even if the
input was never before seen by the model.
This data driven learning approach became popular in 2012 when
AlexNet25 won the ImageNet Large-Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC)
of classifying images to one of twenty-two thousand classes.26
There are many variations to ANNs, including their architecture (the size
of the input, number of layers, number and size of filters, size of output and more),
the type of input-output used, and the computations performed within the ANN.
Thus, the ANN has been developed to deal with many tasks ranging from image
classification,27 image captioning,28 image enhancement,29 and many more
applications, even beyond the realm of visual data.
Forgery detection has also advanced using ML and ANN models. These
models were trained on datasets of original and forged images, and the output is
binary – the image is real or forged (fake). The accuracy of these models trumps
classical methods by far when considering the visual result. The human eye is
unable to detect forgeries that state-of-the-art learning models are able to detect.30
1. Generative Adversarial Networks
Forgery and fake data were originally defined as any change or tampering
in the data, compared to its state immediately following its acquisition. That is,
data manipulation was performed on existing source data that had previously been
acquired. However, in 2014, a paper describing a new type of learning model called
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) completely redefined forgery. These
models have the ability to create new, previously non-existent images and videos
of scenes, people, and objects – data which has no source of acquisition.31 Computer
graphics have long been able to synthesize objects and scenes; however, never with
the simplicity and at the unbelievably high quality of these GANs. Figure 5 shows
examples of fake images created using an ANN model:32

24 Vladamir Naeteki, An Overview of the Supervised Machine Learning Methods, 2017
HORIZONS SCI. J. 51, 55–57, https://tinyurl.com/58449k8j.
25 Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, & Geoffrey E. Hinton, ImageNet Classification with Deep
Convolutional Neural Networks, 60 COMM. OF THE ACM 84, 84–90 (2017).
26 See IMAGENET, https://www.image-net.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
27 Waseem Rawat & Zenghui Wang, Deep Convolutional Neural Networks for Image
Classification: A Comprehensive Review, 29 NEURAL COMPUTATION 2352, 2352–2449 (2017).
28 Simao Herdade, Armin Kappeler, Kofi Boakye, & Joao Soares, Image Captioning:
Transforming Objects into Words, 32 NEURIPS 1, 1–3 (2019)
29 R. Alaguselvi & Kalpana Murugan, Image Enhancement Using Convolutional Neural
Networks, 2019 IEEE CONF. ON CLEAN ENERGY AND ENERGY EFFIC. ELECTR. CIR. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=9167741.
30 See WHICH FACE IS REAL, https://www.whichfaceisreal.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
31 See Goodfellow, supra note 5.
32 See Andrew Brock, Jeff Donahue, & Karen Simonyan, Large scale GAN Training for High
Fidelity Natural Image Synthesis, 2019 INT’L CONF. LEARNING REPRES. 1.

[21:82:2022] Judicial Errors: Fake Imaging and the Modern Law of Evidence

89

Figure 5: Synthesized (fake) images created using a model.33
One of the major achievements of these algorithms is the synthesis of
high-quality face images that are impossible to distinguish from real images using
the naked eye. Figure 6 demonstrates several examples of fake faces of people that
do not exist, created using another GAN model.34

Figure 6: Face images of people who do not exist.35
2. How Does a GAN Work?
Above, we described the standard methods of training supervised-learning
models.36 A GAN is a type of ANN where two supervised models are trained
concurrently. To understand how they help each other learn, we use the artist and
critic analogy: One model is an artist. It receives an input of a random image (an
image with random values; consider this a blank canvas with no painting). Its job
is to learn how to turn this canvas into a realistic painting. The second model is the
critic, it has the knowledge of what realistic paintings are supposed to look like.
The critic model receives the painting that the artist model created and puts out a
binary decision indicating if the input is a realistic painting (real) or artist drawn
(fake). Feedback from the critic (namely, your painting was found to be nonId.
See THIS PERSON DOES NOT EXIST, https://www.thispersondoesnotexist.com/ (last visited
Nov. 24, 2021).
35 Id.
36 See Modern Forgery: AI-based Image Forgery and Detection, supra § B.
33
34
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realistic, i.e., fake) helps the artist change the way it paints so that the painting
becomes more realistic. On the other hand, as the artist improves, the critic also
improves and becomes more precise in its ability to distinguish real from fake. The
training process continues until the critic can no longer distinguish between
artist-generated paintings and real paintings. The critic (known as the
“discriminator”) is a classifying model trained on a dataset of real and fake images.
The artist (known as the “generator”) is an image manipulation model, with its
input image being a random image (in practice–a random number).
Thus, in the face generation example37 (Figure 5), the generator learns
what makes a face image look real. It learns features such as the texture of the
skin, the shape and position of the eyes, nose, and mouth. The trained GAN model,
after convergence, can then be used to generate novel images. The generator
network of the model receives a random image and manipulates the pixels to form
a face image in accordance with what it learned during training. Because the
discriminator challenged the generator constantly during training, it learned to
form the face features with great accuracy. Since the input to the GAN is a random
image which is transformed to a face image, if the random image is changed, a
different face is generated.
Note that GANs, unlike conventional learning models, do not require a
paired input-output image dataset in the training. This eliminates the effort of
creating a dataset of reference images, which can be expensive and inaccurate.
GANs are capable of great realistic learning. Numerous studies have been
published using GANs for different generating tasks. GANS are also capable of
manipulating images by changing hair style, expression, pose, adding glasses or
beards, and changing the age of subjects. Figure 6 shows examples of image
manipulation (hair style) from text input.38

Figure 7: Changing hairstyle using GANs.39

See THIS PERSON DOES NOT EXIST, supra note 34.Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.
Or Patashnik et al, Styleclip: Text-Driven Manipulation of Stylegan Imagery, 2021 IEEE/
CVF INT’L CONF. COMPUTER VISION 2085, 2089.
.39 Id.
37
38
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3. Deep Fake: Video Mirroring
One of the most advanced GANs in the context of visual forgery is coined
the “Deepfake,” in which the model mirrors the motions, expressions, poses, and
audio of a source person to a target person. This task had been researched in the
past, but due to its difficulty, the output quality was never convincing, and it was
very easy to spot fake videos. The introduction of Deepfake poses a major threat to
detecting fake videos. CNN wrote an article about the Pentagon’s race against
Deepfake videos.40 Numerous videos of highly realistic fake videos of American
presidents and other famous personas can be found on social media and on
YouTube41

C. Digital Image and Video Forgery–Summary
Whether classical or data-driven forgery methods, numerous studies are
being published every year. New algorithms, learning models, and GANs are being
introduced to forge visual data, as well as studies attempting to detect forgeries.
This is a game of cat-and-mouse, with no end to be expected. The best strategy for
addressing forgeries is to create a set of tools for forgery detection based on the
known forgery algorithms and to continuously update this set. The need for these
tools is undeniable, as the human eye is no longer able to distinguish real from fake
data. It is also important to note that even state-of-the-art forgery detection
algorithms do not perform with 100% success. Much like a polygraph test, or any
other tool of detection used today, there are always false classifications.
II. LAW OF EVIDENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE
This chapter, which will deal mainly (as the heading indicates) with
modern evidence law,42 is divided into two parts. The first part outlines the
prevailing trends in evidence law generally, with a specific focus on the Israeli
law.43 The second part of the chapter reviews these trends with emphasis placed
on their place in the digital age, i.e., how to handle and use digital evidence and
how to best utilize scientific and digital evidence.

40 See Donni O’Sulligan, When Seeing is No Longer Believing: Inside Pentagon’s Race Against
Deepfake Videos, CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/01/business/pentagons-raceagainst-deepfakes/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
41 E.g., Diep Nep, This is Not Morgan Freeman–A Deepfake Singularity, YOUTUBE (Jul. 7,
2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxXpB9pSETo.
42 The initial inspiration for this expression is credited to Prof. Gabriel Halevy. See GABRIEL
HALLEVY, EVIDENCE LAW THEORY 151–158 (2011) (although the expression has been used in
earlier case law as well). See also CrimA 6147/92 State of Israel v. Cohen, 48(1) HCP 62 (Date)
(Isr.) (Wherein her Hon. Justice Dorner states in para. 9 to her verdict that: “Modern evidence
law tends to minimize restraints on judicial discretion over technical rules, and are founded on
the principle of free evaluation.”).
43 We should note that Israeli evidence law is largely consistent with evidence laws of
England and the U.S., which is in turn consistent with Israeli law being founded in the
Anglo-American legal tradition. This being the case, it stands to reason that this review of the
Israeli law will shed some light on the same issues presented under those legal systems, at least
to some extent.

[21:82:2022]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

92

A. Trends in the Modern Law of Evidence
As noted above, we are in the “modern age” of evidence law. This period
has ushered in two primary trends, which, without regard to their purpose and
essence, pose a grave threat both to fact-finding and to the fundamental rationale
of Israeli evidence law: the fair investigation of truth44 in view of the unyielding
march of technological progress. We will present these trends below.
The first trend involves the transition from “admissibility” to “weight.”
The Israeli model (whose sources and founding rationale stem from
Anglo-American evidence law)45 initially adopted strict, formalistic rules of
admissibility of evidence. Over time, the Israeli model has shifted towards the
more flexible regime of probative weight assignment.
Prof. Barak’s words apply here, as he outlined:46
Even the procedural law–criminal and civil alike–is
characterized by an informal perspective. For instance, the rules
of probative weight of evidence have transplanted the rules of
admissibility; the court seeks to enter the lobby, and not wait in
the corridor, with the aim of spurring the deliberation to uncover
the truth. To the same extent, a fault in the proceeding that does
not amount to a miscarriage of justice is not grounds for a
mistrial.
We should note that this trend of affording the court a wide berth
of discretion is found in other jurisdictions as well,47 and is not
44 This is consistent with the material basis for Israeli evidence law, which adopts the
deontological approach to evidence law–i.e., the fair investigation of the truth. This approach,
which promotes a dual commitment to the principle of convicting the guilty and that of acquitting
the innocent, and the difficulties inherent therein have been discussed by Menashe previously.
See Doron Menashe & Limor Riza, Probative Incentive for Inducing Cooperation Between Suspects
and the Prosecution, 25 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. LEGAL REVS. 845, 859–61 (2009) (Isr.); Doron Menashe
& Eyal Gruner, Should Judges Convict Based on Their Speculations of Guilt?, 36 BUFF. ENVTL.
L.J. 129, 129 (2019).
45 This is because of the British mandate that ruled the region prior to the establishment of
the State of Israel. For more on the connection between the English and Israeli legal systems see
Assaf Likhovski, Between Mandate and State: Re-thinking the Periodization of Israeli Legal
History, 19 J. ISR.. HIST. 39 (1998) (Isr.).
46 Aharon Barak, The Israeli Legal System, Tradition and Culture, 40 HAPRAKLIT 197, 208
(1992) (Isr.), translated in EUROPEAN LEGAL TRADITIONS AND ISRAEL (M. Rabello ed. 1994).
47 It’s worth noting that the other branches of law are less formalistic and more liberally
interpreted. Several years after Additional hearing CrimA 23/85 State of Israel v. Tubul, 42(4)
HCP 309 (1988) (Isr.), the Constitutional Revolution transpired, granting the court wide
discretion with regard to judicial oversight on the basis of the limitations clause. See CA 6821/93
United Bank Mizrahi Ltd. v. Migdal Commune, 49(4) HCP 221 (1995) (Isr.). Justice Barak’s ruling
in the Bank Mizrahi case is identical to the comments conveyed in his article. See Barak, supra
note 39. Whereby the court “seeks to enter the lobby, and not wait in the corridor.” Id. From this
point forward, even in instances where the state has acted by power of law, the court may still
“enter the lobby” by applying the tests of reasonability and proportionality set forth in this ruling.
Similarly, even in the event that evidence is not strictly admissible (“legal”), the court can “enter
the lobby” and examine the question of its probative weight. See MENACHEM MAUTNER, THE
DECLINE OF FORMALISM AND THE RISE OF VALUES IN ISRAELI LAW 503 (1993). This applies equally
to constitutional and administrative fields of law, with emphasis on the tests of reasonability and
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unique to the Israeli system. International law in its entirety48
has similarly adopted so-called “over-relaxed admissibility
rules.”49
The second trend (though it can, in essence, be posed as a corollary of the
primary trend) is the “abandonment” of the best evidence doctrine, as expressed
through the case law that has changed the known position of the Supreme Court,
year by year.50 The new rule that has supplanted the original does not require a
given quantity of evidence, but instead reflects the predilection to pursue the most
primary evidence, since this is, by the nature of things, presumed to be the most
reliable.51
This rule has been moderated and winnowed over time by recent case law.52
Initially, the rulings gave rise to exceptions to this rule that sought to contend with
its problematic linearity, whereby its application amounted to a “zero-sum game.”
This rule was then further moderated, as expressed in the Unger case,53 wherein
Justice Heshin reached the following determination, which remains in effect today:
The exemptions and loopholes that have accrued to [the best
evidence doctrine] have withered the import of this rule, and today
this rule scarcely peeps at us from between the lines of its
exemptions. Indeed, it is not unfounded to reason that today, this
rule is satisfied with requiring the litigant to present a suitable
reason for not presenting the original document.
We are left with but to wonder what the “suitable reason” might be that would
satisfy the court. Investigation of further case law in this vein reveals that a
proportionality, the criteria and discussions of which are quite similar to the discussion of
evidentiary weight. It should be mentioned that the criminal proceeding underwent a similar
process, transitioning from discussion of the elements of the crime to discussion of the mens rea,
with reliance on the perpetrator’s mentality serving as a decisive factor in yielding a conviction.
See 1 GABRIEL HALLEVY, THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 13–14 (2009).
48 See Riccardo Vecellio Segate, Cognitive Bias, Privacy Rights, and Digital Evidence in
International Criminal Proceedings: Demystifying the Double-Edged AI Revolution, 21 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 242, 242–79 (2021). Similarly applicable here are the words of Segate at the start
of his article: “Over-relaxed admissibility rules become unsustainable as far as digital evidence is
concerned, in that they add to the latter’s inherently low reliability and heavy cognitive impact.”
Id.
49 Id. On these rules, cognitive biases and the risk of judicial prejudice resulting from same,
we will expand in § C(3), infra.
50 See CA 28/49 Zarka v. Attorney General, 4 HCP 504, 515–16 (1950) (Isr.) [hereinafter the
Zarka case]. On pp. 515 of the verdict, Justice Agranat established the significance of this duty
incumbent on the litigant by virtue of this rule: “The meaning of the aforesaid rule is that the
party bearing the burden of evidence must present the court with the best evidence available,
which, by the nature of things, is presumed to be present.” Id. at 515. Later, on pp. 516 of the
verdict, the court explains the founding premise of this rule, as Justice Agranat states: “The
purpose standing behind the aforesaid rule is to prevent any attempt on the part of the party
bearing the burden of proof to mislead the court by hiding evidence.” Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
51 See Doron Menashe, The Requirement of Reasons for Findings of Fact, 8 INT’L COMM. L.
REV. 223, 223–245 (2006).
52 See e.g., CA 373/54 Aharonost v. Noyman, 10 HCP 1121 (1956) (Isr.). Wherein Justice
Zussman stated in para. 7 to his verdict that, “When a litigant does not bring forth evidence in
their possession that is likely–though not required–to serve as the basis for reaching a conclusion,
[it is assumed] that they withheld such evidence because it is detrimental to that litigant’s case.”
See id.
53 CA 6205/98 Unger v. Ofer, 55(5) HCP 71 (2001) (Isr.) [hereinafter the Unger case].
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“suitable reason” is an illustration that the copy is of the same quality as the
original evidence. This reason is, of course, completely opposed to the underlying
premise of the best evidence doctrine, which seeks to prevent the infiltration of
forgeries, and not merely to ensure that the court sits on a crate of evidence of any
particular level of quality. In this state of affairs, it would seem the evidentiary
flexibility that has accompanied the march of technological development has
created a circumstance where the court’s practical ability to investigate the truth
has been compromised. As his Hon. Justice Rubenstein noted, “The law is chasing
technological developments, and the legal conundrums they present; chasing, but
not overtaking.”54
This is the place to note that, unlike in other areas, where the court
recognizes its own limitations as relates to evidence law, the court will in many
instances refuse to recognize such limitations as far as technology is concerned.55
Accordingly, and with respect to digital evidence in particular, judges are
vulnerable to many cognitive biases.56 But this only scratches the surface;57 we will
discuss the totality of cognitive biases derived in the present situation in Chapter
3.3 below.
B. Law of Evidence Trends Against the Technological Development
At this stage, we will examine technological developments through the
lens of the two principal trends presented above: The transition from
admissibility to probative weight, and the abandonment of the best evidence
doctrine. In recent times, and as a direct consequence of Justice Heshin’s ruling

54 File No. 5870/14 High Court of Justice, Accountants HPC Business Information Ltd. v. The
Courts Administration (Nov. 12, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
See Assaf Herdof, Voyage Between Authorities: Infiltrating Computer Hardware and Infiltrating
the Legislature, 228 DEF. ATT’Y 4 (2016); Doron Menashe, A New Paradigm for Understanding
Judicial Notice and Its Implications in The Modern Digital Era, 9 ELON L. REV. 267, 267 (2017).
55 E.g., when there is a need for actuarial computation of losses or calculation of damages
caused to houses or cars, the courts are often assisted by assayers or accountants. When there is
a suspicion of forged handwriting, the court is availed of graphologists as needed. And yet, the
court rarely seeks the expertise of technocrats or raises doubts about the authenticity of digital
evidence. For an expanded discussion of this topic, see Eric Van Buskirk, & Vincent T. Liu, Digital
Evidence: Challenging the Presumption of Reliability, 1 J. DIGITAL FORENS. PRAC. 19, 19–26
(2008).
56 The most relevant being the fallacy of overconfidence in the evaluation. In this regard,
unsurprisingly and similarly the other decision-makers under conditions of uncertainty, as
described above, judges also make use of heuristics and logical shortcuts that can give rise to
systematic errors. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777,
784 (2000); Doron Menashe & Hamutal E. Shamash, The Narrative Fallacy, 3 INT’L COMMENT.
EVID. 1 (2006).
57 E.g., under circumstances where there is a lack of awareness and comprehension as to the
ubiquity of forgeries among the general public, the availability fallacy all but guarantees severe
risk allocation errors. The frequency of the relevant category of cases (e.g., the base rate of
forgeries among the general population) affects the probability of a specific instances belonging
to that subset (e.g., the probability of a specific article of evidence being forged), but not the level
of similarity to that subset (e.g., the level of similarity between the given article of evidence and
the subset of forged evidence). This is bound to lead to undervaluation of the data concerning the
frequency of forgeries among the population, and thus, undervaluation of the all-important data
relevant to gauging the probability of the instance in question belonging to that subset. See
Guthrie et. al, supra note, 49, at 780–782. The position of this study is that the aforesaid statistic,
notwithstanding its current place in Israeli evidence law, ought to be available for the court to
use in many cases. See, e.g., Amit Pundik, Proving Causation with Statistical Evidence, 41 TEL
AVIV UNIV. L. REV. 253, 294 (2018).
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in the Unger case (as presented above),58 the case law has continued this trend of
easing restrictions on submitting digital evidence to the court, in spite of the
inherent difficulties in doing so. To quote Justice Shoham in this regard with
respect to the John Smith case (“Justice Shoham’s Ruling”):59
[O]n the backdrop of the trend of easing the rules of admissibility
of evidence, and to focus on the question of the weight and
reliability of evidence . . . as well as in light of technological
developments that have allowed for the presentation of copied
documents that are identical to the originals, the “best evidence
doctrine” has only continued its decline. Pursuant to this trend,
case-law has determined that the contents of a document can be
proven using a copy–i.e., secondary evidence–as long as the
relevant litigant provides a suitable reason for failing to present
the original document [ . . . ] in effect, the rule that has taken
hold in case-law is that “in absence of doubts as to the reliability
of the copy, failure to present the original document shall not, in
and of itself, degrade the evidentiary foundation of the litigant
seeking to make use of same.” (Civil Appeal 9622/07 Holin v.
Clalit HMO of the General Organization of Workers in Israel,
Nevo Legal Database (May 30, 2010).
Justice Shoham’s verdict in the John Smith case showcases the court’s
modern approach to digital evidence, which assigns a sort of “presumption of
integrity” to same.60 Based on his ruling, barring a specific doubt as to the veracity
of a copy, the failure to bring the original evidence itself does not undermine its
evidentiary foundation. Effectively, this ruling requires the litigant demanding the
best evidence to refute the presumed integrity of the secondary document.
This goes a step further than the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Unger
case, which requested presentation of a suitable reason for failing to be the original
document. In practice, Justice Shoham’s ruling is no less than a complete reversal
of the best evidence doctrine, and an unwarranted one at that. Let us reiterate,
given the importance of this point, that apart from waiving the best evidence
doctrine, we are also essentially transferring the burden of proof as to the
reliability of the document to the litigant who claims against it, in a manner that
is likely to harm the weaker party in court.61 It is worth mentioning that, later in
CA 6205/98 Unger v. Ofer, 55(5) HCP 71, (2001) (Isr.).
CrimA 4481/14 John Smith v. State of Israel (Nov. 16, 2016), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
60 Id. We must point out here that foreign rulings have established that, in certain cases,
there may be a “presumption of fallibility,” i.e., his Honor’s ruling is actually opposed to these
other approaches.
61 At the risk of over-expounding on this issue, it is possible that abstaining from discussion
of the potential for forgery, alongside the presumption of integrity set out by the Supreme Court,
will create a situation on which powerful players in the market will be incentivized to “bluff.” For
example, a claim against a large cellphone provider could be thrown out because of a forged
contract, a “photocopy” of which (easily forged) could be presented under this presumption of
integrity. As an aside, the subject of forgery itself is unlikely to be raised by the court on account
of the aforesaid presumption, so the challenger would be required to challenge this point
independently. Not only this, but the party attempting to raise a claim of forgery would need to
overcome a significantly expanded burden of proof. See, e.g., CA 3725/08 Hazan v. Hazan (Feb. 3,
2011), Nevo Legal Database (by scubscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). Wherein Justice Procaccia
58
59
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his ruling, which was largely acceded to by his colleagues on the panel, he did
recognize the greater forging capabilities that exist in the digital age; however, he
assigned only passing significance to this point.62
Under these circumstances, we can see that the choice to forgo the best
evidence doctrine was based on the starting premise that technological
developments have brought us to a place where there is no material difference
between the original document and a copy. While this sentence is not, in itself,
inaccurate, and this study does not presume to suggest otherwise, this approach
nonetheless fails to account for several problematic aspects of the above statement,
as we will present below:
First, the choice to forego this rule creates a wide opening for evidence
forgers to exploit. Compared to the original article, a copy is far easier to forge.
Similarly relevant here are the words of Haim Rabia:63 “Jurists are accustomed to
thinking of evidence as fixed, tangible and clear. Digital evidence is something
other entirely: for as it is generally easy to identify attempts to counterfeit a
physical item, electronic articles are subject to constant change, and can be
manipulated without leaving a trace of interference.” After all, a date scribbled in
the handwriting of the litigant is hardly comparable to a Microsoft Word contract
wherein the date is digitally imprinted on the file, and can be edited without
leaving any clues. A further indication of this is brought in Chapter 1 above,
wherein we established the ease with which photographs can be forged today.64
Second, and with respect to the epistemic value of evidence that does not
meet the bar of the best evidence doctrine, it must be noted that presenting such
evidence contravenes the founding principles of evidence law, as well as due
determined her ruling that, “A litigant who raises a claim of forged contract against their
counterpart levies a serious accusation, one that can even amount to an accusation of fraud or
false representation. As a rule, claims of this nature, which generally involve an insinuation of
bad faith, require a significant threshold of proof be met to uphold them. Accusing a litigant of bad
faith, deception or fraud requires firm and reliable evidence. And just as accusing a person of
fraud requires a high bar of evidence to uphold, so, too, claims concerning a fabricated deal, which
similarly involve accusations of fraud, require a level of evidence whose weight and import match
the severity of the claim.” Id. at ¶ 31 (emphasis added). Meaning, the procedure required to prove
falsification of evidence, and the burden of proof incumbent on the litigant who raises such a
claim, will themselves prevent the issue of forgery from being raised. I don’t believe, to put it
mildly, that this is an ideal order of operations.
62 See CrimA 4481/14 John Smith v. State of Israel, (Nov. 16, 2016), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). Justice Shoham stated in his verdict, “I believe that closer scrutiny
of the reliability of the recording may provide a solution to such doubts, since it is specifically in
light of recent technological developments that it has become easier to forge recordings using
software, without leaving a physical trace.” Id. at ¶ 35. I.e., the justice is aware of this concern,
but believes in the ability of the court to expose forgeries under closer scrutiny.
63 2 HAIM RAVIA , ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
(Isr.).
64 See NIMROD KOZLOVSKI, THE COMPUTER AND THE LEGAL PROCEEDING 34 (Bar Ass’n Pub’g,
2001) (Isr.)
In a paper document it is relatively easy to identify when more than one actor
has edited the document. This is also true of “documents” that are not paper
documents. An example of this would be an audio recording on which more than
one voice can be heard, and wherein, by identifying these voices, it is possible
to identify the speaker. On a computer, by contrast, a single “document” might
have been edited by multiple users, without this finding any external
expression in the completed “document.” In many cases, we would be left with
no clue as to what actor inserted specific inputs, nor would we have any
guarantee establishing that the party purporting to be the source of such inputs
was, in fact, their source.
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process–such can even be seen as constitutional principles.65 Moreover, it is the
right of every litigant, and every defendant in a criminal trial, that law
enforcement institutions will do all that is in their power to ensure that the
evidence forming the basis for their conviction has a minimal potential for forgery
and/or fabrication. This is the only consistent approach with the principle of
protecting the innocent from false conviction.66
Third, and as far as claims of “efficiency,” which would ostensibly justify
the court’s ruling are concerned, we must emphasize that claims of this nature,
that regard efficiency, saving valuable court time and preventing miscarriages of
justice, all unequivocally support the notion of bringing no less than the optimal
evidence before the court to establish any given fact.67 In this sense, it could even
be argued that, above all else, Justice Shoham’s ruling harms the educational
contribution inherent in the fastidious requirement of the best evidence doctrine.68
This educational contribution is expressed in the understanding that only through
exhaustive investigation, which produces the best evidence, can we minimize, to
the greatest extent possible, the risk of false conviction. As matters stand today,
we can already see indications (even if few in number) of indictments filed wherein
the investigative authorities were not in possession of the “best evidence” to
establish the guilt of the defendant, and the investigators were lax in their pursuit
of the truth.69 This phenomenon, of the cheapening of procedure and the growing

65 See Doron Menashe, On the Necessity of the Best Evidence Principle, 25 HA-SANEGOR 3
(1999) (Isr.).
66 See Nahshon Shohat, The Moral and Legal Duty to Protect Innocents from False Conviction:
A Critical Analysis of the Legal System’s Normative and Procedural Derived Obligations (essay
for the completion of a doctorate in Philosophy, March 2015) (Isr.).
67 Menashe, supra note 56, at 4–6.
68 Although we should note that Justice Shoham’s ruling was the direct continuation of prior
rulings in this matter. See, e.g., CA 2450/01 Rubenstein v. Ein Tal, Ltd., 55(4) HCP 385, 386 (1983)
(Isr.) (emphasis added). Wherein Justice Dorner states:

It must be noted that this manner of using electronic documents holds
advantages over only using original documents. Among these advantages are
saving time and costs, streamlining the proceeding, elevating the degree of
accuracy, ease of retrieval, the convenience of inferring conclusions and more,
depending on the case . . . thus, being assisted by technological means, in
general, and electronic documents in particular, is desirable and commendable.
69 To reiterate, realizing the epistemic, probative value of investigating the truth requires the
greatest possible reconstruction of the truth, and not an “efficient” reconstruction. As an aside, the
Supreme Court has already declared that it does not intend to pursue merely the maximum
quantity of evidence, as stated in Zarka: “The rule requiring the presentation of the best evidence
does not require the relevant party to collect the maximum quantity of evidence relating to every
single fact, nor that such party should be compelled to seek better evidence than the material
available to it. Indeed, the entire purpose underpinning this doctrine is to prevent fraud by
undermining any potential attempts by the party charged with presenting evidence to conceal such
evidence from the eyes of the court.” CA 28/49 Zarka v. Attorney General, 4 HCP 504, 517 (1950)
(Isr.) (emphasis added) The Zarka case also illustrates for us the optimal balance with respect to
the burden of evidence incumbent on the accuser: there is no requirement that maximal evidence
be brought, but only, that the best evidence available be brought. As described above, this balance,
requiring the best available evidence to be brought, has been weakened over the years, and would
appear to no longer be carefully kept.
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concern of false convictions, is finding expression both in Israel 70 and around the
world.71
Perhaps it is easiest to summarize the current state of affairs per the
approach of the Israeli judiciary by citing (in its own words) the ruling of the Tel
Aviv Magistrates Court in the Allenby 99 case: 72
The world of technology is advancing at the speed of light. The
technical means at the disposal of the reasonable person are highly
advanced, with these advances progressing at a pace that dwarfs
the pace of legislative and case-law proceedings in the conservative
world of law by several orders of magnitude. By the time a precise
legal verdict is reached with respect to the means of recording
under examination, it will likely be rendered obsolete by some new
and updated arrival. Today, recording using a tape recorder is
already quite rare. Recordings are usually made using simple
devices that are available to anyone, such as a smart phone. Such
a device is not readily accessible to the litigant, it being the
personal device of the person performing the recording. An audio
file is the appropriate means of discovery and examination of this
sort of recording. Therefore, the demand to receive a tape recording
and the device with which the recording was produced is an
outdated request, one inconsistent with the pace of this generation.
Now, in light of the above-described state of affairs, we will proceed to
describe the serious risk-allocation errors caused, among other things, by the
combination of these technological developments, on the one hand, and the
development of modern evidence law, on the other hand.
III. DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A NON-DIGITAL COURT: INHERENT RISKS OF ERROR
In this chapter, we examine the difficulties stemming from the multitude
of digital evidence and the manner in which these are submitted to a court, whose
proceedings and procedures are unsuited to deal with evidence of this nature.
Ignorance of this specialized field leads to cognitive biases on the part of the court.
Given the nature of this evidence and the ease with which they are forged (as
illustrated above), these biases create a serious concern of risk-allocation error on
70 See File No. 44591-11-10 Magistrates Court (Haifa), Internal Affairs v. Elhades (Dec. 4,
2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). Wherein a police officer was
convicted of staging evidence by forging the testimony of the eyewitness. The forgery involved
adding items to the testimony so that it would match the description of the defendant. This serves
to illustrate the erroneous approach of the officers in attempting to reach a conviction while
ignoring the danger of convicting innocents. This is, of course, consistent with the abandonment
of the best evidence doctrine, as described above.
71 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1037, 1044–47 (1996); Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The Blue Wall of Silence as
Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 246
(1997).
72 File No. 60129-12-12 Magistrates Court (TA), Allenby 99 v. Naqdai (Jul. 22, 2014), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) [hereinafter the Allenby 99 case]. Various
courts have upheld this ruling. See File No. 34162-08-17 Magistrates Court (TA), Levy v. Bareket
Chicken and Turkey–Factory Store, Ltd. (Sept. 28, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription,
in Hebrew) (Isr.). Indeed, parties to the proceedings–and, in particular, defendants–will complain
about the ease with which photocopies are admitted, as evidenced by the case law.
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the part of the court. At the end of the chapter, we will discuss current efforts to
contend with these difficulties.
A. The Characteristics of Digital Evidence and the Inherent Concerns
Relying Upon Them
The characteristics of digital evidence are different from those of other
forms of legal evidence. The difference is found in the manner in which the evidence
is obtained (digitally), its recording, its analysis, and its presentation to the court.73
The legislature has recognized the existence of digital evidence and its unique
properties in the Evidence Ordinance. Yet, notwithstanding its inherent
distinctiveness, only a handful of articles are dedicated to it, which cannot suffice
as a comprehensive and exhaustive understanding of its application.74 Recently, a
renewed effort was made to expand the Evidence Ordinance’s reference to digital
evidence. In 2017, a memorandum of law was tabled on the Knesset plenum to
amend the Ordinance in order to bring it in line with the aforementioned Supreme
Court case law relating to the elimination of the best evidence rule.75 In addition,
the memorandum of law seeks to go a step further by adding a specific reference to
digital evidence to the Ordinance. For instance, the memorandum would add
computer files to the definition of a “document.”76
The reason for this appears simple: there is significant probative value in
adding digital evidence of all kinds to the totality of evidence presented to the
court, both because more evidence is likely to yield a better-founded ruling,77 and
given the court’s preference to be exposed to the actual documented event, in lieu
of testimony of some kind or another.78 The court’s aspiration to widen the basket
of evidence to the greatest extent possible is evidenced often and consistently.79
In essence, this memorandum of law represents a practical illustration of
the approach of the Israeli court system, which tends, as illustrated above in the
John Smith case, to overemphasize on digital evidence generally, and on digital
73 See EHUD ROFFEH, PRACTICAL DIGITAL EVIDENCE–LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 19 (Bursi
Publ’g, 2014).
74 E.g., Evidence Ordinance Law, 5731–1971, § 39A (1971). The Evidence Ordinance
disqualifies digital evidence consisting of a computer extract that amounts to an opinion. In doing
so, the Ordinance appears to draw an analogy between classical evidence and digital evidence by
installing identical requirements: that opinions must be supported with expert testimony.
75 See Memorandum of Law, Draft Bill to Amend the Evidence Ordinance (Originals and
Copies as Evidence), 5778–2017.
76 Id. at § 40. (proposed definition of “document” is “To include computer materials, as defined
in Section 1 of the Computers Law.”).
77 All subject, of course, to the rules of admissibility, as set out in the Evidence Ordinance
Law, supra note 74.
78 It should be said that the preference for evidence in the form of a recording over the
testimony of a witness who heard that same audio has been confirmed by research. Consider, for
example, under circumstances where John hears a conversation between A and B, whereby A
appears to solicit B to commit a crime. If John is brought to testify that he heard the solicitation,
his testimony will inexorably contain additional interpretation, i.e., his interpretation of the
words he heard. Thus, the court is dependent on the tone of speech described by John, the
linguistic nuances, expressions, and so forth. This dependence is not present in evidence
consisting of a digital recording of that same conversation. See MALCOLM COULTHARD ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC LINGUISTICS: LANGUAGE IN EVIDENCE 131 (Routledge, 1st ed. 2016).
79 See File No. 62272-08-18 District Court (Haifa), Abu Hadir v. Goldwag (Dec. 30, 2018),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) Wherein the district court refused to
order the exclusion of the recordings made with the respondent’s cellular phone, among other
things, because these recordings served to illustrate the relationship that had existed between
the parties, which was a relevant finding to reaching a verdict.

[21:82:2022]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

100

copies in particular. Given this reliance, the proposal was shot down by various
parties to the proceeding, especially by parties representing those standing to incur
potential injury from adoption of said proposal, i.e., the defendants in criminal
trials. Take, for example, the letter delivered by the deputy chief of the Criminal
Law Forum of the Bar Association, Dr. Nahshon Shohat, which lays out ad
nauseum the inherent difficulties, both practical and academic, contained in this
approach.80 Given the importance of Dr. Shohat’s words in connection with the
attempt to do away with the best evidence doctrine, we will quote them verbatim:
“This doctrine must preserve the crucial status of the court as the ‘gatekeeper,’
protecting the trial from biases and forgeries . . . and this doctrine must protect
litigants from exposure to risk-allocation errors that were inadmissible from the
start (in the sense that they are impossible to contend with).”
From the above discussion (which is not intended to be exhaustive), it can
be unequivocally argued that there are different (and indeed, sometimes
diametrically opposed) viewpoints with respect to admissibility of and reliance on
digital evidence; yet there is no Israeli legal literature on this particular subject.81
Opinions remain divided, and the risk of error, alongside the volume of digital
evidence submitted to courts, only continues to grow.
Thus, since everything stored on an electronic drive, such as a computer or
a smart phone, constitutes digital information, there are very few cases (civil or
criminal) that do not include evidence sourced to computers, phones, or other
digital means.82 The difficulties described above are what led to the application of
the tests for admissibility of scientific evidence from the well-known Daubert case83
being applied to digital evidence as well.84 In this regard, it should be noted that
there have been many instances in Israeli law wherein over-reliance on digital
evidence has led, in effect, to risk-allocation errors and associated damages. This
is true not only of the classical legal proceeding, but also of various entities that
rely on digital evidence and digital documents (i.e., files), such as the Income Tax

80 Letter from Dr. Nahshon, Deputy Chief of Crim. L. F. of the Bar Ass’n, to Knesset Comm.
(July 25, 2017) (on file with author) (This letter was dispatched personally by its author, Dr.
Nahshon Shohat, after being sent to the Knesset committee presiding over the aforesaid
memorandum of law. The letter will be provided upon request).
81 The author of this study is aware of the important book, H AIM WISMONSKY, CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION IN CYBERSPACE (2016); see Haim Wismonsky, Sentencing Guidelines for Computer
Crimes, 24 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 92 (2008). Nonetheless, despite his broad understanding of the
collection of this evidence, the author does not address the question of the proper evidentiary
model for digital evidence.
82 The main difficulty here is that digital evidence is perceived by the public (including the
legal community) as more authentic (in real time), durable and reliable than “classic” documents,
without accounting for the broad potential for manipulation and forgery of these documents.
83 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316–17 (9th Cir. 1995). Wherein the
Ninth Circuit established a four-point test for determining if evidence is admissible and reliable:
(1) examination of the theory or technique by which the evidence was collected; (2) determining if
the theory in question has been peer-reviewed; (3) determining if the technique in question enjoys
the support of a consensus of experts in the relevant field; and (4) the rate or potential for error
associated with the theory or technique. Id. And while the rate of error for digital evidence in
general is not high, the court must ask: where was this digital information located from the time
of its production and until its submission to the court? Was it published publicly? Were true copies
of it distributed to third parties? These questions are rarely asked by the court, and thus, it seems
that the potential for error associated with digital evidence may be higher than that associated
with it today.
84 See Buskirk, supra note 55, at 23–24. See generally Williford v. Texas, 127 S.W.3d 309,
312–13 (11th Cir. 2004) (providing extensive discussion of application of Daubert to technology.
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Authority, which relied on a forged invoice;85 or a Korean corporation that held all
of its correspondence over email, only to discover that it had been dealing with a
hacker the entire time.86
This blatant threat of forgery, and the various means and capabilities that
exist to stage and fabricate evidence, demands discussion of how the criminal
justice system should address digital forgeries, as opposed to conventional
forgeries. While this study does not address the substantive criminal law, we
should nonetheless note that an inherent part of the proposed solution to the
difficulties posed above relies on distinguishing between different types of
forgeries. It is evident that this matter, as well, regarding the diagnostics and
isolation of the various forms of forgery, demands its own separate, comprehensive
and exhaustive research.87
In summary, the over-reliance on digital evidence, coupled with ignorance
of the subject matter among a large portion of the public, and the widespread
forging capabilities (as demonstrated by the e-mail debacle described above);88 the
85 See CrimC File No. 2657-08-13 (TA), State of Israel v. Kardish (Jan. 14, 2016), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). Wherein the defendant was accused of “editing,
producing and extracting, using a computer at his office (and paid software), 1170 fictitious
invoices appearing to be tax invoices. The aggregate sum of these invoices amounted to ILS
81,223,554, bearing taxes in the amount of ILS 11,339,261. The defendant issued these fictitious
invoices to companies and dealers, and received monetary compensation that he did not report to
the tax authorities.” Id. at ¶ 4.
86 File No. 50665-08-16 (BS), Hae Kwang Co. Ltd. Jinkwang v. Hensel Phelps Construction
Co. (date), Nevo Legal Database (unpublished) [hereinafter the Kwang case]. In this particular
case of reliance on e-mail correspondence, we should do well to heed the words of Omer Cohen:
“Since the e-mail titles are originally generated by the mail server that handles the message
delivery, they add a plethora of environmental variables attesting to the existence of the message,
in addition to backing up the date and time on which they were generated and reached their
destinations. Since these titles are generated by the server, any simple user can, after
understanding the structure of the titles, verify the sender of the message (such as banks or other
service providers) and thus avoid falling prey to phishing scams.” Omer Cohen, Reliability of
Digital
Evidence,
DIGITAL
WHISPER
(Aug.
2010),
https://www.digitalwhisper.co.il/files/Zines/0x0B/DW11-3-DigitalEvidence.pdf (emphasis added).
87 Already today, we are receiving indications of the aforesaid normative hierarchy.
Conceptual indications of this can be seen scattered throughout the case law relating to the
interrogative schemes of the Israel Police. Even in this case law, there is an approach taken
whereby an officer lying during an interrogation is not as serious as presenting a false document
to a suspect. The former will not result in the disqualification of the suspect’s confession, but the
latter, on the face of it and if the case law is any indication, will. In other words, one interrogative
trick might be deemed “tolerable,” while another is “unacceptable.” This normative hierarchy can
be applied to the issue of forged materials. See CrimA 8702/12 Zawi v. State of Israel (Jul. 28,
2013), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); CrimA 2831/95 Alba v. State of
Israel, 50(5) HCP 221, 291 (1996). Thus, in broad strokes, it would appear that when the time
comes for this study to discuss the criminal justice system’s treatment of digital forgeries, as
opposed to regular forgeries, the principle characteristics that we will need to avail ourselves of
are: the mens rea of the forger; the potential for deception; the element of preparation and work
required to create the forgery (which is somewhat connected to the mens rea, if not entirely
overlapping); and the theoretical consequences of the forgery, were it to be successful. To be clear,
these are only broad conceptual strokes in a tangential discussion, which do not purport to
exhaust this topic.
88 See Wismonsky, supra note 81, at 25–26, wherein he states that digital evidence is
perceived as objects in the physical realm, while, in reality, the fact that it is digital and exists
only in the cyber realm materially alters the nature of such evidence, and the manner in which
we should examine it. Id. Moreover, closer examination of this sort of evidence, according to the
author, similarly yields the conclusion that this evidence is not impregnable, and that their
reliability should be regarded as doubtful. Id. (emphasis added). Accord Cohen, supra note 79, at
7 (“We should recall that any space can be penetrated and any document can be forged; ultimately,
this is simply a question of time and resources.”) (emphasis added).
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aforesaid under-enforcement with respect to obstruction of evidence in the broad
sense (both in terms of classical forgery and digital forgery); and the inability to
identify digital forgeries,89 all combine to create a clear and present danger of
errors in risk-allocation as relates to the forging of digital evidence. This clear and
present danger is only exasperated, a fortiori, in light of the cognitive biases
associated with the issue, as we will illustrate below.
B. Cognitive Biases of the Non-Digital Court in the Digital Era
Having explored the properties of digital evidence and the dangers
associated with their forgery,90 we will now illustrate how these properties greatly
exacerbate the risk-allocation errors that plague the various legal instances,
through the lens of the cognitive processes employed by decision makers (which are
regularly evidenced by the courts as well),91 bearing in mind the biases applicable
to courts examining digital evidence, and especially images as illustrated above.
As noted above, decision making is a cognitive process, and in this sense, there is
no difference between a judge and any other person. This is true of any decisionmaking process, but particularly true of decision-making under conditions of
uncertainty. In their study on the matter, Tversky and Kahneman empirically
illustrated how people rely on any number of heuristic short-cuts (or “rules of
thumb”) to estimate values and probabilities, and how, in many cases, the results
yielded by these heuristics do not reflect the sought values and probabilities in
practice.92 In one of their studies, Tversky and Kahneman expanded this notion to
show how, when we attempt to make judgments under conditions of uncertainty,
we are likely to fall victim to serious and systematic fallacies.93
However, it gets worse. As we will demonstrate below, the presence of
digital evidence and, in our case, digital images in the courtroom itself evokes

Wismonsky, supra note 81, at 25–6.
See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1291–95, 1300–01
(2003) (more discussion on the topic of the danger of forgery); Greg Marston & Rob Watts,
Tampering with the Evidence: A Critical Appraisal of Evidence-Based Policy-Making, 3 THE
DRAWING BOARD: AN AUSTRALIAN REVIEW OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 143, 149–52 (2003); Micah K.
Johnson & Henry Farid, Exposing Digital Forgeries in Complex Lighting Environments, 2 IEEE
TRANSACT. ON INFO. FORENS. AND SEC. 297, 450–61 (2007).
91 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, THE PROBLEMS WITH HEURISTICS FOR LAW 1 (UCLA Sch. of
L., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 04-1, 2004) (emphasis added):
89
90

A large body of evidence, now familiar to the legal community, demonstrates
that individual judgment and choice is often driven by heuristic-based
reasoning, as opposed to the pure optimization approach presumed by rational
choice theory. The evidence of heuristic-based reasoning presents several
challenges for consequentialist legal scholars who wish to make normative
public policy recommendations.
See AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JUDGMENT UNDER U NCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
BIASES (1974), reprinted in DANIEL KAHNEMAN , RATIONALITY, FAIRNESS, HAPPINESS 45–63
(Maya Bar-Hallel ed. 2005); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124–31 (1974) (Original Article); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265–
68 (1979).
93 KAHNEMAN, RATIONALITY, FAIRNESS, HAPPINESS, supra note 85, at 45. Specifically, they
mention that, “We rely on a limited number of heuristic principles that the reduce complex tasks
of evaluating probabilities . . . generally, these heuristics are quite useful, but they can sometimes
lead to serious and systematic errors.” Id. (emphasis added).
92

AND
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inherent cognitive biases.94 These cognitive biases, which are prevalent in the
courts, will naturally result in mistaken rulings, and even convictions of
innocents.95 For good measure, we will present below the three most significant
cognitive biases that find expression in the courts’ attempts to wrestle with digital
evidence, and particularly, with images.
1. Confirmation Bias and Presumption of Integrity Regarding Digital Evidence
The first cognitive issue relates to the overvaluation that courts tend to
assign to visual evidence. This argument is based on studies that have illustrated
how the courts tend to valuate visual evidence (i.e., images) as more persuasive, or
as deserving of greater credit or valuation, than verbal evidence in the form of the
testimony or affidavit of a witness.96 This is in light of the ostensible objectivity of
videos and visual images, which purport to present facts directly and without
interpretation (“naïve realism”).97 In practice, however, the manner in which a
video clip is presented can reflect several subjective influences, such as the length
of the video, the angle and other choices that are, in their totality, at the discretion
of the photographer.98 Thus, even though we ought to understand that the
documentation shown to contains a consistent line of interpretation offered by the
photographer, the court will nonetheless treat this as objective documentation.99
This presumption of integrity, and the judges’ disregard for the selectivity inherent
in these forms of documentation, raise serious difficulties. Accordingly, it has been
argued more than once that the basing of legal arguments on images threatens the
courts’ fact-finding process by presenting articles purporting to be “facts” before the
judge at an early stage of the proceeding.100
2. Wrong Application of Availability Bias
The second cognitive difficulty relates to the availability heuristic, as
evidenced in the research conducted by Tversky.101 Using this heuristic, it has been
empirically proven, decision-makers tend to evaluate the probability of an event
occurring based on its availability, i.e., the probability of such an event occurring

See Segate, supra note 48, at 254–256.
Doron Menashe, Can the Pursuit of Truth Reconcile with the Principle of Minimizing False
Convictions?, 21 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 381, 393–95 (2020).
96 See Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1687–95
(2014).
97 Segate, supra note 48, at 255.
98 Id.
99 It should be emphasized, as an aside, that there is entire profession consisting of “Photo
manipulation,” which goes to illustrate the importance and potential impact of such manipulation.
See Wilson Lowrey, Normative Conflict in the Newsroom: The Case of Digital Photo Manipulation,
18 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETH., 123–42 (2003); Allison J. Lazard et al., Impact of Photo Manipulation
and Visual Literacy on Consumers’ Responses to Persuasive Communication, 39 J. OF VISUAL
LITERACY 90, 90–110 (2020); Cuihua Shen et al., Fake Images: The Effects of Source, Intermediary,
and Digital Media Literacy on Contextual Assessment of Image Credibility Online, 21 NEW MEDIA
& SOC’Y 438, 438–463 (2018).
100 See Segate, supra note 48, at 256; Porter, supra note 96, at 1693.
101 VARDA LIEBERMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, CRITICAL THINKING: STATISTICAL REASONING AND
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 122–29 (1996) (Isr.).
94
95
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as conceived in their mind.102 In other words, our perception of the frequency of an
incident is influenced by our memories of similar incidents occurring. Thus, we are
more influenced by our own ability to conceive of a thing than we are by their
objective probability in practice.103
The difficulty presented by the availability heuristic is exacerbated in our
case, since courts generally lack knowledge in the field of digital forgery.
Consequently, the probability of this occurring, per their internal perception of it,
is especially low, to the point of being negligible or even non-existent. Since the
probability of forgery as imagined by the court is much lower than its probability
in reality, we find ourselves in a position where the court is quite likely to err in its
evaluation of the situation, resulting in false convictions.
Moreover, this difficulty is further exasperated, a fortiori, in light of the
erroneous valuation of probability a priori, which stems, among other things, from
the very ignorance that plagues the courts with regards to digital evidence.104
3. Quantity Bias
Further to the fallacy concerning the false application of the availability
heuristic leading to the mistaken evaluation of the base frequency rate, we should
also note the third cognitive difficulty, which relates to the influence of a large
quantity of digital evidence, such as a large number of digital images and/or data
on a cellular device. There is a tendency to grant a large quantity of evidence of
this nature a certain probative weight, despite that such quantity, under the
circumstances, is not deserving of such probative weight.105 Thus, the concern is
that the images will then go on to serve in place of the entire legal argument, until
we reach a point where the legal case consists of simply one massive databank of
images,106 leading the examiner of the statement of claim – i.e., the court – to
believe that these form a coherent case, regardless of whether or not they actually
do.107
4. The Story Model and Its Application Regarding Digital Evidence
According to the “Story Model,” as described in greater depth in the books
of Zamir and Teichman,108 evidence is essentially a set of tools that serves the
courts in constructing the story, or narrative, that will serve as the set of facts upon
which their legal ruling will be based. In their word: “The creation of a narrative
that explains the various items of evidence that have been deemed reliable and
relevant–is the core cognitive process by which the facts in adjudication are
determined.”109
The Story Model starkly illustrates the risk-allocation errors that occur in
judicial rulings. Since the Model is comprised of the evidence presented to the
102 On the relationship between the availability Heuristic and judicial decision-making, see
Hami Ben Nun, Cognitive Biases, Intuitive Judicial Decision –Making and Methodical Thinking
in the Work of the Judge, 5 GATES OF L. 177, 207–08 (2010) (Isr.).
103 Lieberman & Tversky, supra note 101, at 124–25.
104 Hami Ben Nun, supra note 102, at 195–99.
105 Porter, supra note 96, at 1694.
106 Id.
107 See e.g., Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 511–21, 523–86 (2004).
108 See EYAL ZAMIR & DORON TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 527–28 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2018).
109 Id. at 529.
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court, the presiding panel’s knowledge of similar incidents, and additional
information is subjective to the specific incident. In our case, as shown above, it is
not inconceivable that the court, when crafting such a narrative, will find itself
working with the doctored evidence (as noted above–doctored images); and with its
faulty valuation of the frequency of this phenomenon (which is caused by the
availability bias, as described above). Based on all of the foregoing, the court will
seek to craft a story that most precisely fits the evidence presented before it. This
concern only grows a fortiori when the litigant that has forged evidence is aware
that it is precisely the evidence they have forged that can best serve to shape the
court’s narrative into the narrative they choose.110 Other studies regarding the
Story Model have found that, the more that the story presented by a litigant is
found to be both coherent and encompassing of the evidence, the greater confidence
the court will assign to their version of events.111 Moreover, the court’s confidence
will only grow in light of the lack of plausible alternative “stories,”112 i.e.,
alternative hypotheses that could serve to refute the story as told. Given all of the
foregoing, it would seem that, in these circumstances, the forger possesses two
alternatives that can be used to base their claim. The first, and most obvious
alternative, is to create an image/evidence that will support their story. The second,
following from the first, is to doctor evidence that undermines the story of their
counterpart, thus leading to the rejection of their claim.113
We can illustrate the difficulty posed by digital evidence in terms of the
story model as follows: Suppose there is a dispute among tenants in an apartment
complex relating to the aspirations of Tenant A to expand his apartment, along
with the other apartments in the building. Tenant B opposes the expansion, and
thus prevents all of the building tenants, including Tenant A, from expanding their
apartments and taking advantage of the associated financial benefits. At the
conclusion of a tenant meeting, A declares that he intends to cause financial
damage to B, just like B caused financial damage to him through his intransigence.
Around a week and a half later, B approaches his car and discovers that it has been
damaged–all of the windows are broken and the tires have been punctured. As he
approaches his car, a neighbor informs him that he saw a figure bearing
similarities to A loitering near B’s vehicle. Based on this account, B files a financial
claim against A for damaging his car, and for the property damage incurred to him
as a result. B’s evidence consists of A’s declaration of intent to cause him financial
damage; documentation of the damage that occurred; and the testimony of the
neighbor regarding the circumstances, whereby a person of the same height and
weight as A was seen loitering near B’s vehicle just before the damage occurred. A,
who believes his chances in pitting his account against B’s are not high, forges two
articles of evidence. The first article: A photo of himself on a camping trip from that
same say. The second article: A fictitious receipt for gas at a gas station located
dozens of kilometers from the place where the incident occurred, bearing the same
110 This is a very serious concern, given that the judges seek to establish facts in such a
manner that the facts they establish will best explain the evidence in the file. See id. at 529.
111 See Nancy Pennington, & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model
for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); Nancy Pennington
& Reid Hastie, Reasoning in Explanation-Based Decision Making, 49 COGNITION 123, 134–36
(1993); Reid Hastie, The Case for Relative Plausibility Theory: Promising, but Insufficient, 23
INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 134, 134–40 (2019).
112 For Zamir’s and Teichman’s words, see Zamir & Teichman, supra note 108, at 529–30.
113 On the difference in bringing refutational evidence in the course of the court’s fact-finding,
see Craig R.M. McKenzie et al., When Negative Evidence Increases Confidence: Change in Belief
After Hearing Two Sides of a Dispute, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2002).
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date and time as that of the incident. As we explained above, there is no way for
the claimant to refute this narrative, since the fictitious gas receipt appears to
completely refute B’s narrative by providing A with a solid alibi. Under these
circumstances, even were it to be determined not to assign any weight to the
receipt, the combination of these two articles of evidence would still refute B’s
story.114 Furthermore, should B attempt to summon the gas station workers to give
testimony as to the authenticity of the receipt, the court would likely reject such a
motion, seeing as the camping picture would still lead to the factual finding that
the defendant possesses an unrefuted alibi.115
Maintaining our focus on the story model and its application to the world
of digital evidence, we will now address efforts to contend with these difficulties.
C. Attempts Dealing with Digital Evidence–Overview
In light of the aforesaid cognitive biases afflicting the court, it is important
to note that digital evidence effectively constitutes the catalyst and incentive for a
significant portion of these biases. This leads, little by little, to the degradation of
the judges’ cognitive perceptions, which in turn impacts their evaluation of which
facts are relevant to the case’s needs.116
However, notwithstanding the foregoing, it would appear that judges who
are aware of this issue and come cognitively prepared to contend with the issues
surrounding digital evidence are likely not to suffer from the aforesaid biases.117
An example of this can be seen in the Andalib-Goortani case,118 which illustrates
for us the challenging nature of digital evidence from the opposite perspective. In
this case, the court faced a criminal trial wherein a police officer was charged with
assaulting a protestor during protests against the G20 Summit in Toronto. The
main evidence presented against the officer was a photograph that was uploaded
to the internet anonymously. In this case, the court ruled that the picture was
inadmissible because the prosecutor had not succeeded in proving that the picture
was not staged or altered in any way.119 The main difficulty arising from this
verdict stems from the fact that the complainant had confirmed that the picture
114 To be clear, the court is likely, notwithstanding a determination that this evidence is
inadmissible, to reach a fact-finding conclusion on the basis of its existence. See Zamir &
Teichman, supra note 108, at 567 (discussing the court’s difficulty ignoring inadmissible evidence
and other information to which it is exposed).
115 Granted, this determination effectively assigns probative weight to an ostensibly
inadmissible article of evidence, as long as it is not submitted by its creator. Nonetheless, for the
sake of efficiency and sparing judicial resources, as well as other reasons, the courts tend to accept
evidence that is inadmissible or partially admissible, and determine guilt based on the assistance
they provide, both in civil (as described in our example) and criminal proceedings. On the
admissibility of evidence that is inadmissible in criminal proceedings, see Doron Menashe & Guy
Alon, Criminal Law—Does A Confession Matter? A Defendant’s Confession as Irrelevant to Prove
His Guilt, 42 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 191, 201–04 (2020).
116 See Segate, supra, note 48, at 260–61.
117 Id.
118 R. v. Andalib-Goortani 2014 ONSC 4690 (Ont. S.C.J.) (Can.).
119 Id. at ¶ 34. It is important to note, in respect of this verdict, that it discusses home graphics
editor suites and illustrative of the issues surrounding digital evidence. See id. at ¶ 31. Similar to
the difficulties we indicated with regards to the IDF and the falsification of sick notes, here, as
well, it was Photoshop software that irked the court. See id. at ¶ 32. In this context, claimant may
argue that the bar is too high–i.e., that from now on, any prosecutor seeking to rely on digital
evidence would be required to prove that the evidence was not staged or altered in any way. This
would mean, in effect, that digital evidence would be rendered inadmissible by default almost
across the board.
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was consistent with her memory of the attack, and with the height and appearance
of the officer. Despite this, and despite the apparent consistency of the
complainant’s account with photograph, the picture did not meet the admissibility
test. This, in spite of the fact that in the past, such evidence would have been
considered sufficient to verify the integrity of a video or picture.120
The arguments provided in the verdict explain that the reason the evidence
was thrown out by the court stemmed from the fact that the picture was essentially
from an unknown source (“Open-source evidence”); i.e., one obtained from public
sources, and that as such, its probative value lessened,121 since its nature and
reliability could not be verified.
It thus seems that, no matter what direction we approach from, this
(admittedly superficial and non-exhaustive) review illustrates the inherent
difficulties presented by digital evidence, as the situation stands. As an aside to
this review, we also illustrated the issues presented by the Israeli law’s failure to
properly enforce in this regard, and, for the sake of contrast, presented other case
law illustrating the dangers inherent in over-enforcement–or, at the least,
reasoning to that effect. This study will attempt to find the appropriate balance by
proposing a model that addresses all of the relevant considerations, including, in
particular, the desire to widen the evidence basket as much as possible, albeit not
at the cost of increasing the risk of error or contaminating the legal proceeding.122
This will come on the heels of successfully demonstrating–as was done in the
aforesaid Andalib-Goortani case–how each article of evidence could be fabricated
and staged, and the inherent danger in the court’s basing of fact-finding on
fabricated evidence. We will also proceed to elaborate on how the approaches of
Israeli law exacerbate these issues tenfold, due to human error.
IV.

THE ISRAELI LAW OF EVIDENCE AND ITS UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS

As mentioned above, following the British mandate that ruled over the
territory prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, the Israeli legal system
maintained its form as a Common Law system. Accordingly, the Israeli system
functions as an adversarial system,123 wherein the court is passive and the parties–
i.e., the litigants and their counsel–are responsible for conducting the proceedings.
To clarify, the parties are responsible for monitoring the evidence and identifying
omissions, and it is they who must object to a particular article of evidence. As
described above, this adversarial model creates very real challenges in light of the
120 See David Tanovich, Andalib-Goortani: Authentication & The Internet, 13 CRIM. REP. 140,
140–143 (2014) (Can.) (offering criticism on the verdict); Brock Jones, Authenticating Online
Images Key to Their Admissibility: A Comment on R v Andalib-Goortani 2014 ONSC 4690, CANLII
CONNECTE (Feb. 5, 2015), https://canliiconnects.org/fr/commentaries/35673 (Can.).
121 See Lindsay Freeman, Digital Evidence and War Crimes Prosecutions: The Impact of
Digital Technologies on International Criminal Investigations and Trials, 41 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
283, 334–35 (2018).
122 For more reading on the contamination of the legal proceeding, and on the relationship
between the prejudicial effect of evidence and its probative value, see Doron Menashe, That’s Not
It, Further Thoughts in the Wake of the Olmert Conviction, 12 LEGAL BULL. 80–82 (Isr.). Rule 403
of the Federal Evidence rules in the United States, entitled “Excluding Relevant Evidence for
Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons,” states, “The court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
123 See Ray Finkelstein, The Adversarial System and the Search for Truth, 37 MONASH UNIV .
L. REV. 135, 135–43 (2011).
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realities of legal practice in the State of Israel, which stem from an overabundance
of lawyers. Below, we will discuss the issues arising from this legal practice when
applied to the Israeli Common Law system (or any Common Law system, for that
matter).
A. Israel's Number of Advocates and Its Implications
As of April 5, 2021 one out of every 128 residents of the State of Israel is a
lawyer.124 This is the highest per capita ratio in the world. In the Center Block,
which mainly encompasses the city of Tel Aviv, one in every 20 residents is a
lawyer, with the vast majority of these (some 70% being below the age of 40).125
On the face of it, the multitude of lawyers have served the Israeli public well–and,
in particular, the more vulnerable segments of society. Now, owing to the ubiquity
of lawyers, legal services are essentially accessible to the public, with law schools
opening up across the country, from Safed in the north and all the way to Sderot
in the south.126 Thus, Israel has become a land bustling with lawyers and,
ostensibly, with social justice127 and the social rights that accompany it.128
And yet, in Israel, rather than finding ourselves in a race to the top,
wherein said vulnerable populations receive good, quality legal services to assist
them in protecting their rights, we instead find ourselves in a race to the bottom,
wherein the more the number of lawyers in Israel increases, the poorer the quality
of the legal services provided.129 This drop in quality mainly steams from basic
economics, as a result of the situation where the supply continues to grow
astronomically out of proportion to the demand. This results in a situation where
many lawyers struggle to find employment, owing to the fierce competition that
inevitably sidelines many of them. The flooding of the profession, as it has been
written, “causes some lawyers to specialize in everything, without specializing in
anything. Even worse, the financial distress causes many lawyers to seek to break
into fields in which they never specialized, and at times, even to cause serious
damage to their clients, who believe that merely their status as lawyers is
sufficient.”130
124 See Lital Dobrovitsky, The Ratio of Lawyers to Population in Israel–the Highest in the
World, YNET (May 24, 2010), www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3893213,00.html; Oleg Morbyov,
Israel Leads in Number of Lawyers Per Capita, DAVAR (Apr. 5, 2021), www.davar1.co.il/294855.
125 See Dobrovitsky, supra note 124.
126 Albashan has written extensively on the importance of having many lawyers and thus
removing the economic and geographic barriers that would otherwise bar vulnerable communities
from access to their legal rights. See Yuval Albashan, Access to Justice of Underpowered
Communities in Israel, 3 ALEY MISHPAT 497 (2003) (Isr.).
127 See Karen L. Loewy, Lawyering for Social Change, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1869 (2000);
Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical Lawyers: Social Justice and the Structures
of Private Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 201 (A. Sarat & S. Scheingold eds., 1998).
128 The connection between social justice and social rights has been examined at length by
Albashan as well. Albashan, supra note 19. See also T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class,
in CLASS, CITIZENSHIP & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 46 (1964) (from the very start of the movement).
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this is not a widely held position in Israel, and there are many
approaches that see no advantage in investing public resources in expanding the community of
lawyers in Israel. See Yaara Levi & Yigal Borochovsky, Who Needs Lawyers? Stop Subsidizing
Law School, THEMARKER (Feb. 5, 2019), www.themarker.com/news/education/1.6911937 (Isr.).
129 See Lital Dobrovitsky, 10 Tips for Picking a Lawyer, YNET (Dec. 15, 2003),
www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2839956,00.html (Isr.).
130 Id. at ¶ 1.
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In addition to the overabundance of lawyers, there’s also the matter of the
level of education received at the law schools. Many voices in the Israeli academia
have sounded the warning in recent days. Many and leading researches in Israel
have declared, “The legal profession in Israel is facing its greatest crisis since the
founding of the State, as the academic level of legal studies is terrible across the
board.”131 Astoundingly, these claims have been raised as well by none other than
the heads of the Israeli Bar Association, who have asserted that “not everyone who
graduates law school should be a lawyer. Those who wish to be lawyers ought to
undergo a much more rigorous academic track, of much greater quality, than that
which they are subject to at present.”132 Such statements regarding the dismal level
of legal training in Israel have even been sounded by the Israeli legislature.133
With the multitude of lawyers, their (ostensibly) dismal level of
performance, and the economic influences that have affected the legal field, we find
ourselves in a circumstance wherein many lawyers find themselves taking on as
many cases as possible in order to earn a living.134 This is because, as mentioned
above, lawyers are earning less and less for each case they take on135 and it should
be emphasized that this matter has been discussed at length in the professional
quarters, and there appears to be a consensus among the members of the Bar
Association that these statistics are “deeply troubling.”136
131 See Hila Raz & Nurit Roth, Criticism of the Level of Legal Studies at Colleges Stems from
Frustration with the Universities, HA’ARETZ (Dec. 28, 2018), www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1370004
(Isr.).
132 Id. In the words of Adv. Yoram Guy-Ron, former chairman of the Israeli Bar Association.
This statement related to the need, as he saw it, for the Bar Association to be involved in the
training process, in order to prevent the situation that we find ourselves in today.
133 See, e.g., statements issued from the Knesset in the Draft Bill. This was also voiced in
greater detail in the protocol of the hearing of November 23, 2009: “Obtaining a lawyer’s license
has become a relatively easy track compared to other professions, such as accountancy, psychology
or medicine; the period of studies is brief; some of the institutions even teach on a biweekly basis;
only a bachelor’s degree is required to obtain a lawyer’s license; the acceptance conditions and
period of the internships are very short. This situation has also led to the opening of many law
schools, which has in turn promoted lower acceptance standards and, ultimately, an unnatural
glut of lawyers flooding the market. But more importantly–it has seriously degraded the level of
the profession.”
134 See Tamar Kricheli-Katz et al., Hierarchy and Stratification in the Israeli Legal
Profession, 52 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 436 (2018), wherein the difficulties created by the flooding of the
profession are described: “The flooding of the profession is problematic in two senses: From the
vantage point of the public, the issue stems from the fact that the public must contend with an
excess of lawyers, without a means to gauge which are quality professionals and which are less
so, increasing the risk of mishandling of cases, up to the point of malpractice. However, the
flooding of the market is problematic for lawyers as well, and is accompanied by such side-effects
as lowering the esteem of the profession, uncontrolled competition and a ‘race to the bottom,’ and
a dramatic decrease in legal fees.” Id. at 436–37. See Ori Shilo, A Multitude of Malpractice Suits–
a Warning Sign for Lawyers in the Real Estate Market, THEMARKER (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.themarker.com/realestate/1.3125691 (Isr.).
135 See Ella Levy-Weinrib, The Flooding of the Profession, Overburdening the Files and
Maintaining the Rule of Law: The Burning Problems of the Elected Chairman of the Bureau, YNET
(June 18, 2019), www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001290067 (Isr.). In the body of that
article, in discussing the urgent matters facing the new chairman of the Bar Association, the
author notes that “Whoever is elected to lead the Bar Association will be required to address the
issues that are plaguing lawyers today, including the flooding of the profession and loss of respect
for its practitioners . . . in addition to – for many lawyers, especially among younger lawyers – the
financial squeeze and difficulty making a living in the profession.” Id. (emphasis added).
136 See Ella Levy-Weinrib, Candidates for Head of the Bar Association Respond to Survey of
Lawyers’ Salaries Published on Globes: “Disturbing Figures,” YNET (May 27, 2019),
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To provide a fuller picture, below is a table of salaries per the results of the
market survey conducted regarding the salaries of lawyers in Israel.137

www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001287293 (Isr.). This article is published pursuant to a
survey that was taken regarding lawyers’ salaries in Israel, which indicated that a third of
lawyers earn less than ILS 11,000 gross per month (a sum barely a few hundred shekels higher
than the average salary in the economy). See Ella Levy-Weinrib, Survey: One Third of Lawyers
Earn Less Than ILS 11 Thousand Gross. And How Much Do They Earn in the Top 0.1% of the
Profession?, YNET (May 27, 2019), www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001287162 (Isr.).
137 See GLawBAL, Situation Snapshot, Trends and Changes in the Legal Sector in Israel and
Abroad, GLAWBAL (Jan. 1, 2020), http://www.glawbal.com/upload/Legal%202020.pdf (Isr.)
[hereinafter GLawBAL Study].
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Decile
1

Monthly Salary Range
for Israeli Lawyers (in
ILS and USD)
Between ILS 4,977-5,855
(USD 1,542-1,815)

Experience

Type of Firm

0-2 years at firm

Small firms, mainly
in the periphery
Small firms

2

Between ILS 5,856-8,805
(USD 1,816-2,739)

3

Between ILS 8,806-11,102
(USD 2,740-3,442)

0-2 years at firm with
some prior experience (up
to 5 years)
0-2 years at firm, prior
experience (up to 5 years)

4

Between ILS 11,10313,972 (USD 3,443-4,331)

0-2 years at firm, prior
experience (up to 5 years)

5

Between ILS 13,97315,815 (USD 4,332-4,902)

6

Between ILS 15,81619,261 (USD 4,903-5,971)

0-2 years at firm with
prior experience, some
contract partners and
partners
Midrange associates,
senior associates,
contract partners and
partners

7

Between ILS 19,26223,706 (USD 5,972-7,349)

Midrange associates,
senior associates,
contract partners and
partners

8

Between ILS 23,70729,295 (USD 7,350-9,081)

Senior associates,
contract partners and
partners

9

Between ILS 29,29640,508 (USD 9,08212,557)

Senior associates,
contract partners and
partners

10

ILS 40,509 or higher
(USD 12,558 or higher)

Senior associates and
partners

Small and mediumsized firms
Small and mediumsized firms and some
large firms
Small and mediumsized firms, some
large firms and
boutique firms
Small, medium-sized
and large firms,
assorted highly
rated- boutique
firms
Small, medium-sized
and large firms,
assorted highly
rated- boutique
firms
Small, medium-sized
and large firms,
assorted highly
rated- boutique
firms
Small, medium-sized
and large firms,
assorted highly
rated- boutique
firms
Medium-sized and
large firms, and
luxury boutique
firms

This is an extremely difficult and untenable situation, where the salaries
of some 30% of lawyers are actually below (or equal to) the average earning wage
in the economy. To the best of our knowledge, there is no precedent for such a
dynamic in any other country in the world, where tens of percentiles of lawyers
that have undergone studies, training and passed the Bar examinations are
earning less than the national average. This helps us to understand how we have
reached the situation we find ourselves in, where lawyers are taking on more cases
than they can manage, which, in turn, further harms the professionalism of the
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lawyer, who is limited in time and manpower and cannot manage an infinite
number of cases. This is an anticipated consequence of the flooding of the profession
and depressed wages, and it is inexcusable.
Unlike the issues stemming from the abundance of lawyers, which, exists
in the United States as well,138 we can see that the depressed wages, both
objectively and comparatively, are a unique feature of the Israeli legal field.139
However, this isn’t the only gap between Israel and the United States as it relates
to lawyers’ salaries. An in-depth read of the GLawBAL study reveals that there is
also a significant gap in the pricing systems routinely employed by lawyers.
Whereas in the United States, some 54.6% of income comes from hourly billing,140
the rate of income from cases billed hourly in Israel stands at only 36.7%.
Another gap worth mentioning between the U.S. and Israel involves the
division of the profession into classes based on fields of employment. For instance,
in both Israel and the U.S. there is a gap between commercial lawyers, who deal in
the field of trade (including commercial litigation), and between lawyers employed
in “household” fields,141 owing to the nature of the clients (individuals versus large
corporations). And yet, this gap is far more moderate in the U.S. compared to the
gap in Israel. While this discrepancy stood at 215% in the U.S. as of 2018, the same
figure stands at 392% in Israel. This illustrates the low salaries that lawyers
employed in household fields can expect, which are the fields in which the most
vulnerable members of society tend to be active.142
In summary, the State of Israel is home to a disproportionately large
population of lawyers, many of whom are forced to take on an excessive burden of
cases in order to make ends meet. At the same time, there are worried voices from
academia stating that the level of training these lawyers receive is insufficient or,
at the very least, doubtful.143 Not only are the skills of these lawyers in question, it
138 In certain parts of the United States, the excess of lawyers is more apparent even than in
some parts of Israel. E.g., in the District of Columbia, 1 of every 13 people is a lawyer, and in the
State of New York, 1 of every 113. These are per capita rates of lawyers that match or surpass
even the highest rates in Israel. GlawBAL Study, supra note 137.
139 Given the similarities between the Israeli and American markets–both in terms of the
numbers of lawyers and the trend of overlitigation–Israeli lawyers are compared against their
American colleagues.
140 I.e., cases in which lawyers’ fees are derived directly from the hours of work they invest
in a case.
141 These are lawyers handling personal status law, torts, enforcement and so forth.
142 To be clear, unlike in commercial litigation, where the parties to the proceeding are
commercial corporations, the parties in household cases tend to belong to all segments of the
population. In some of these fields–such as debt enforcement–near exclusive representation of
vulnerable populations can be seen.
143 And this is only further exacerbated a fortiori in the circumstances of our case, i.e., when
such lawyers are called upon to handle matters involving digital evidence, considering that the
legal training does not include (or at least, previously has not included) technological training in
the use of computers. This is very important owing to the great difficulty involved in effecting
changes in the legal system. It’s well known that judges refuse to update their thinking (and the
Digital Revolution is an update that has yet to be properly accounted for by judges). There are
many fields in which it is evident that judges are unwilling to stay current. See Oren Gazal-Ayal,
et al., Do Judges Obey the Law?, 47 MISHPATIM–HEBREW UNIV. L.J. 327 (2018) (Isr.). This issue
has naturally impacted the legal system in the Digital Age more than ever. See Roffeh, supra note
66, at 2. “The twisted results find expression on a daily basis: jurists and judges are called on to
address cases that combine law and technology – and find themselves witless. They must
represent, counsel and render judgment – but they possess neither the necessary knowledge nor
skills to do so. Already several years ago, Justice Dr. Agmon Gonen declared that ‘Courts don’t
need to concern themselves with this;’ another judge admitted in court that he does not know how
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is also questionable how much time they actually invest in each case, since the
pricing structure they employ creates a conflict of interest whereby the lawyer is
incentivized to spend as little time as possible on the case–in stark opposition to
the interest of the client. This difficulty is further exacerbated a fortiori with
regards to lawyers engaged in the household fields, which tend to involve private
individuals in need of assistance. Now, having established this, we shall proceed in
the next chapter to explore the further difficulties that arise from this situation.
B. Israel's Adversarial System and its Implications
The Israeli legal system originates in the Common Law system (itself
originating in England), and, accordingly, it adheres to the adversarial system of
deliberation.144 The adversarial system is known for its primary characteristic: the
minimalist role of judges, who are relegated almost entirely to ensuring the rules
of the game are fair, including by safeguarding the basket of evidence–and, in
particular, discerning which articles of evidence will enter the court file, and which
will be excluded from it.145
We believe that this situation gives rise to a clear and present danger of
false convictions and/or the miscarriage of justice in civil trials. This concern
applies equally to all adversarial systems of law, as it were;146 however, it is further
exacerbated a fortiori in considering of the litigant parties in Israel, as we will
illustrate below.
1. The Parties in the Adversarial System in the Digital Age
As stated above, the adversarial system relies almost entirely on the
parties’ attorneys. The lawyers are the ones who manage the proceeding, and are
responsible for determining which points of contention will be debated. They are
responsible for the discovery; for drafting the preliminary questions to be posed to
the primary witnesses; and for choosing strategy, both in terms of how to proceed
and how not to proceed. The court, thus, remains passive, and adapts itself to the
rules of the game outlined by the parties.
For instance, should party A’s counsel choose an illegitimate or prohibited
strategy that involves attempting to expand the field of debate, presenting
inadmissible evidence, raising claims that cannot be raised at the current stage of
to handle cases involving technology; and a third judge requested to be provided with an expert
opinion from a computer specialist, and even notified the parties that the expert’s opinion would
be binding and final.” Id. It must be emphasized that this is true of the entire system. See Stephen
Mason, Towards a Global Law of Electronic Evidence?, 103 AMICUS CURIAE: J. ADV. LEGAL. STUD.
1, 19–28 (2017). Wherein the following passage is of the highest pertinence to our case: “It seems,
that a large majority of lawyers, legal academics and judges have failed to realize they are now
living in a world dominated by digital evidence, and that digital evidence is now the dominant
form of evidence . . . the majority of lawyers, legal academics and judges do not know they do not
know; a smaller number know they do not know, and an even smaller elite know about digital
evidence, but they are realistic enough they need to know more.” Id. (emphasis added).
144 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM–THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (Harvard
Univ. Press, 2009) (for more discussion on the adversarial system and its contemporary practice).
145 See PETER MURPHY, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE (Blackstone Press, 1992)
(Murphy describes a judge frustrated with the adversarial system with the following dialogue:
“‘Am I never to hear the truth?’ ‘No, my lord, merely the evidence,’ replied counsel.”).
146 Since it is evidence that any adversarial system would seek to “rely” on the litigants as far
as digital evidence is concerned, even if they lack the expertise to ensure an accurate verdict.
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the trial or similar, it becomes the responsibility of party B to object and point the
court to such transgression. Should party B fail to do so, the court, as a rule, will
refrain from interceding and allow the admission of evidence or claims, regardless
of these being against procedure and likely to harm party B.
The concern described above worsened exponentially in the digital age, in
which we are presented with new and sophisticated evidence at a high frequency,
which is also constantly updating and changing over brief windows of time.147 And
yet, the sophistication of this evidence is only part of the problem. The greatest
difficulty is posed by the sheer volume of evidence, with claims frequently being
made to the effect that the court is presented only with the tip of the iceberg of the
full volume of evidence held by the parties.148
In other words, not only is the evidence gradually increasing in
sophistication, but the quantity of evidence is also inexorably growing. The parties
control both the ability to explain the evidence to the court, and the sampling of
evidence presented before the court. This once again illustrates the importance and
significance of the parties themselves in the adversarial system, particularly in the
digital age.149 Furthermore, if this were not enough, it would seem that the court
is aware of its limitations in this regard with respect to digital evidence. These
limitations come into play when a dispute comes before the court relating to digital
evidence, and it is required to decide between the conflicting positions of the
parties. The court, being aware of the difficulties inherent in digital evidence, as
well as of its own limitations, tends toward creating broad rules aimed at providing
a future solution, if and when the same arguments arise again under different
circumstances.150 The result is that the rulings of the various courts in matters
involving new technology are often hesitant, rather than decisive.151 This, in turn,
gives rise to two problems that we will describe below.
The first difficulty, and most significant, relates to the management of
criminal trials in the adversarial system, and, in particular, the abuse of
proceedings by law enforcement agencies resulting from the aforesaid
circumstances. This abuse is expressed in the fact that law enforcement personnel
often find themselves collecting evidence in illegal manners (which is not always
sufficiently clear, when it comes to digital evidence),152 based on the understanding
that there is no clear ruling one way or the other in this matter, if and when it
reaches the threshold of the court (i.e., in the event that the illegal search yields
incriminating evidence). Under these circumstances, where we have an illegal
search, on the one hand, and incriminating evidence on the other, the court is faced
with a difficult decision. Now it must not decide merely on the admissibility of the
evidence, but on the admissibility of the evidence in light of the fact that such
evidence is key to a conviction. For this reason, which is likely to influence the
court’s decision, the law enforcement agents are willing to wager on the fact that
147 See Daniel M. Scanlan, Issues in Digital Evidence and Privacy: Enhanced Expectations of
Privacy and Appellate Lag Times, 16 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 301 (2012) (Can.).
148 Id. at 302.
149 See Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868–69 (2004).
150 See James Stribopoulos, In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the
Charter, 31 QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 37 (2005).
151 Colton Fehr, Digital Evidence and the Adversarial System, 16 CAN. J. OF L. AND TECH 437,
439–41 (2016) (Can.). See R v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 77 (Can.).
152 See Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies:
An Economic Approach, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 501 (2006) (providing discussion
regarding the difficulty this raises under the current circumstances of overload and the need for
legislative intervention).
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the court’s decisions, with regard to the admissibility of evidence, are made ex-ante,
based on the (understandable) faith that a determination regarding evidence
already known to be incriminating will, for obvious reasons, be found in their
favor.153
The second difficulty relates to civil cases in the adversarial system. In civil
cases, as in criminal cases, the advent of digital evidence has generated significant
issues and encumbered the proceeding. Once again, this difficulty stems from the
court’s ignorance of how to best evaluate digital evidence.154 In these
circumstances, as with criminal proceedings, the situation becomes such that the
stronger party with the greater access to resources holds the advantage. The
stronger party possesses the greatest knowledge of and control over digital
evidence; has greater capacity for collecting such evidence; and, as illustrated
above, has the time, resources and know-how so that, if and when the interest
arises, they are primed to make use of evidence whose admissibility is
questionable.
2. The Israeli System and its Increased Risks of Error
In the previous subchapter, we illustrated the difficulties posed by the
adversarial approach in the Digital Age, as well as the many avenues for forging
evidence. Now, we will demonstrate how the Israeli approach and, specifically, the
Israeli courts are the most exposed courts in the world to risk-allocation errors
resulting from forged evidence (relative to other legal systems that also employ the
adversarial method). This conclusion is based on two principal rationales.
The first reason, as detailed above, is the current trend of evidence law
transitioning from rules of admissibility to rules regarding probative weight, which
grant courts greater discretion in choosing whether to admit evidence. As we know,
under the adversarial system, the parties responsible for ensuring fidelity to these
rules, and ensuring that the courts prevent the admission of inadmissible evidence,
are the litigants’ attorneys. And yet, as we illustrated above, Israeli lawyers
specifically are often insufficiently trained and lack sufficient expertise in matters
pertaining to digital evidence. This conduct sometimes impedes the courts, as has
been shown in a study released on the subject.155 In that same study relating to
practices that impede the courts, judges in the various Israeli courts were asked
about this issue, and these judges, presiding over various courts around Israel,
described the phenomenon as follows: “One explanation offered by some of the
judges as to the issue of behaviors that impede the court consisted of a general
explanation that applies to a large proportion of the lawyer population–lack of legal
knowledge and lack of preparation for the trial, or in other words–
unprofessionalism.”156 In layman’s terms, the unprofessionalism of Israel lawyers
is the first reason why the danger of risk-allocation errors is higher in Israel
compared to other legal systems around the world.
But this is not all. The second reason, which is intrinsically tied to the first,
relates to the amount of time each lawyer invests in the cases they manage. This
length of time is directly derived from the profit margin expected to accrue to the
attorney from handling the case, and thus, the amount of resources they are able
See Fehr, supra note 151, at 440.
See Penney, supra note 152.
155 See Chemi Ben Noon, Boaz Shnoor, & Eyal Katvan, Judges’ Perceptions of Lawyers’
Behavior in Court, 20 HAMISHPAT L.J. 11, 21 (2015) (Isr.).
156 Id. at 32–33.
153
154
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to invest in the case. As we have illustrated above, the average wage of Israeli
lawyers is lower (by tens of percentiles) than that of their colleagues abroad,157
which accordingly results in less time invested in each case. This phenomenon is
even more acute with respect to “household” cases, i.e., individual cases. In these
matters, the wage gap is even more pronounced, and so, we can only assume, the
time invested in each case is only further reduced. And to be clear, we should note
that the amount of time an attorney invests in the cases they handle is not without
consequence. For example, a recent study demonstrated an empirical direct
correlation between the amount of time an individual invested in preparing and/or
detecting forgeries, and their ability to prepare and/or detect said forgeries.158
And now, the question must be asked: what conclusion can we reach from
these two trends, given the research with regards to the ability to detect forgeries,
and the special circumstances of the Israeli legal system? There is only one possible
conclusion: that in the State of Israel, the parties facing the greatest exposure to
risk-allocation errors are the most vulnerable populations.
It could be argued that this is yet one more mechanism that is likely to
exacerbate class differences in society by ensuring that in and when judicial errors
occur with respect to the specter of digital forgeries (and all forgeries, for that
matter), they are likely to discriminate against the weaker party. These are the
parties likely to hire attorneys who charge less (and accordingly, lack sufficient
time to invest in each case and to properly examine all of the evidence). These are
the parties most likely to reach settlements that are influenced by this or that
article of evidence in the case file, despite such evidence being staged, forged and/or
otherwise uncorroborated. And, while the error risks affecting the most vulnerable
parties apply to all legal systems, as it were, they are all the more pertinent given
the unique characteristics of the Israeli legal system.
V. CONCLUSION
This study sought to paint a picture of the current difficulties of evidence
law in adjusting to the Digital Age, and to attempt to propose a sustainable solution
to meeting the high rate of technological developments, which continues to lead us
in an uncertain direction–whether forward or backward remains unclear159–with
particular emphasis on the Israeli law, both in theory and in practice.
See § III(A), supra (providing our comparison to the United States).
See Felix Freiling & Leonhard Hösch, Controlled Experiments in Digital Evidence
Tampering, 24 DIGITAL INVESTIG. S83, S83–S92 (2018).
159 The uncertainty pertaining to the vector of developments–“forward or backward”–reflects
the philosophical question of whether technology has taken evidence law to a better place, or a
worse place? Indeed, while it has presented us with the ability to present more and better evidence
(DNA evidence, digital evidence, fingerprints, videos of a greater degree of quality and
accessibility), and thus to better pursue the truth and avoid false convictions, it is nonetheless
true, as well, that technology can be used to falsify and destroy evidence with greater ease than
in the past. Thus, the nature of technology’s impact on evidence law remains uncertain. The words
of Justice Heshin, in his preface to Nimrod Kozlovski’s book The Computer and the Legal
Proceeding are relevant fear, as related on pp. d–e, wherein he writes: “Today we find ourselves
amidst a technological revolution. For the computer and the internet are not mere mutations of
forms of life previously known to us, and accounted for in our legal systems. These are new life
forms entirely, that do not act like the life forms we’ve become accustomed to. They move like the
knight in chess: not exactly forward, not exactly backward, neither to the side nor diagonal; their
movement is a bit of this and a bit of that, and ultimately, its own form. But in this sense, this
157
158
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This review was conducted by choosing a sample incident in which images
were forged, which illustrated succinctly the ease with which images can be staged,
and the difficulty in identifying such forgeries, when it comes to digital evidence.
There seems to be no solution other than to turn the clock back to the period when
evidence laws were carefully kept. Alongside our proposed solution, which will be
based, among other things, on the technological reality and the unique
circumstances of the Israeli legal system, we will attempt to ensure two primary
aspects.
The first aspect of the proposed solution relates to the need for there to be
a way to refute the evidence, i.e., the party wishing to review the picture on
suspicion of forgery must have the ability to confirm the picture’s nature and
content. Falsifiability must be a prerequisite to presenting the evidence, without
which the evidence should be considered inadmissible from the start.160 In
Menashe and Gruner’s book, they illustrate why evidence of this nature should be
blocked–i.e., evidence that is unfalsifiable owing to a “systemic barrier.”161 Per this
approach, an unfalsifiable claim may not be accepted (examples from criminal law
were provided to illustrate), since, according to the authors, accepting claims of this
sort would undercut the effectiveness of the criminal trial.162 From this we can
derive that, in order to accept a factual claim that is made based on evidence, we
must ensure that the party wishing to refute such claim–and consequently, such
evidence–has the ability to do so; and if not, the evidence should fail the systemic
barrier test.
The second aspect of the proposed solution intends to supply the aforesaid
need, i.e., to ensure that the party seeking to oppose the article of evidence in
question is granted the ability to refute it. This is done by establishing a new,
preliminary mechanism that will serve as a necessary prerequisite to submitting
the evidence. This mechanism will aim to achieve two purposes: the first purpose,
is to prevent any incident from transpiring whereby the court is availed of evidence

new life form differs from the knight, since we know in advance how the knight will move, and
we know – if some with greater certainty than others – how to guard against its advance. Whereas
the new life forms of the computer and the internet we have yet to fully understand – we have yet
to reach the bottom of the rabbit hole. Click a button in Jerusalem, and you are in Tel Aviv; click
again, and you are in Australia; click a third time, the whole system revolts, and all is erased as
though it never were. Our actions move at the speed of light, while our bodies remain in the
carriage, and our minds process only as fast as the carriage.” SHNEUR HESHIN, Preface to
NIMROD KOZLOVSKI, THE COMPUTER AND THE LEGAL PROCEEDING, at d-e (Bar Ass’n
Pub’g, 2001) (Isr.) (emphasis added).
160 See DORON MENASHE & EYAL GRUNER, THE ESSENCE OF THE REASONABLE DOUBT IN
CRIMINAL LAW 183 (Nevo Pub’g, 2017) (Isr.).
161 Id. at 99–102. The authors demonstrate this through the example of a defendant who
claims an alibi, despite the existence of evidence placing him at the crime scene–both forensic
evidence, such as photographs and fingerprints, as well as independent witness testimony. Under
these circumstances, any innocence hypothesis–i.e., any claim by the defendant that he is
innocent in spite of the aforesaid evidence against him–amounts, in effect, to a conspiracy theory,
since in order for this claim to be correct, it would need to be based on the premise of the police
having bribed false witnesses and staged the photo evidence, and that the fingerprints were not
left at the time of the crime, but at a later stage. If a defendant is allowed to raise claims of this
sort, the consequence would be that it would be impossible to ever convict a defendant. See ADRIAN
S. ZUCKERMAN , THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 132 (Oxford Clarendon Press., 1989).
162 Id. at 111–12.
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whose authenticity is in question;163 and the second purpose is to establish a
professional mechanism for ensuring that the article of evidence submitted is, in
fact, authentic. In other words, this mechanism will ensure the existence of some
party that is familiar, to some degree or other, with the relevant digital evidence
(in our case, photographs), and that can attest to their quality and reliability. This
is necessary owing to the court’s own lack of expertise in this regard, and, a fortiori,
given the current situation in the Israeli legal system with respect to the
adversarial system and the quality of legal training.
Therefore, and pursuant to the foregoing, our proposal is to assign to the
party wishing to enter digital evidence (and in particular, photographs) into the
court record the burden of submitting an expert opinion stating that the
photograph has been examined by them and is authentic and reliable, and that it
was not found to be doctored. The expert opinion should include an explanation of
the technological means employed by the expert to verify that the photograph was
not forged.
It should be noted that similar arrangements already exist in the Israeli
legal system, largely in the context of providing proof in medical matters. Thus,
just as proving a medical matter requires that an opinion be submitted by an expert
in the relevant field, it would seem that there is no choice but to require similar
proof when seeking to prove matters of technological expertise; in our case, proving
that a photograph or photographs that the party wishes to submit have not been
forged. In the framework of the opinion, experts will be required to assess whether
the image is forged, and in doing so, answer the question of whether it is even
theoretically possible that the picture was forged. This will be done by examining
the most advanced photo-editing technologies, as we discussed above. This
requirement, which involves setting up barriers intended to mitigate the risk of
false judicial rulings, has already been extensively discussed by the Supreme Court
in the Tubul case.164 Given its relevance, we will cite the words of his Hon. Justice
S. Levine: 165
The approach of the majority opinion is too simplistic. It
emphasizes individual cases in which the court, owing to some
evidentiary obstacle, is prevented from pursuing the truth (and
such cases exist, without a doubt); but it also ignores the existence
of many other cases in which the different judges may perceive the
evidence differently from each other, and thus, reach differing
factual conclusions . . . moreover, the “truth” is determined
according to the perception of reality arising from the evidence,
163 While accounting for the fact that when the court encounters inadmissible evidence, even
in situations where it announces unequivocally that it is not going to rely on this evidence, it has
been empirically proven that a certain weight is nonetheless carried by such evidence. See Hanan
Goldschmidt & Yaacov Schul, The Difficulty Ignoring Information–Psychology and Law, 12 LAW
AND BUS. 67, 71 (2010) (Isr.). The study concerned inadmissible information concerning the
criminal record of a litigant in a civil case. In one version of the story, information was presented
regarding the criminal record of the claimant, with the criminal behavior in question occurring
14 years prior to the lawsuit. The control group, meanwhile, was not presented with this
information. The judges were to rule on the matter of the head of damage of pain and suffering,
as well as on whether the information was admissible.
164 See CrimA 23/85 State of Israel v. Tubul, 42(4) HCP 309 (1988) (Isr.). It’s worth noting
that the Tubul case, and all of its implications, has been widely discussed in Israeli legal
literature. See Doron Menashe, Judicial Discretion in Fact-Finding, Freedom of Proof, and
Professionalism of the Courts, 43 HAPRAKLIT: ISR. BAR L. REV. 83 (1993) (Isr.).
165 Id. at ¶ 3.
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which may not reflect the “reality” on the ground. Under these
circumstances, the imposition of “formalistic” evidentiary barriers,
so-to-speak, has the power to balance the equation and to tip the
scales, to some extent, toward standardization in fact-finding–thus
contributing to the security of the legal process and serving as a
constitutional guarantor against human error and arbitrariness.
This proposal, which seeks to impose the attachment of an expert opinion
as a condition for admitting photographs, constitutes that same “‘formalistic’
evidentiary barrier” contemplated by Justice Levine. This is the mechanism that
would seek to secure the legal system against risk-allocation errors by preventing
reliance on bad evidence (as far as pre-emptive strategy is concerned) by requiring
review by a professional to safeguard the integrity of the proceeding.
But this is not all. Our proposed requirement for the attachment of an
expert opinion would also require it to meet the terms of Israel’s Mezgora
precedent,166 which essentially adopted the ruling of the American judiciary in the
Daubert case.167 The rules established in Daubert can be divided into two
categories: material and practical.
Firstly, in terms of the material aspects, it was established that scientific
evidence should be admissible, but must meet several conditions, as determined by
asking the following questions: Is the scientific theory accepted among the relevant
scientific community, and to what extent? What is the known rate of error of the
relevant examination and/or opinion? Was the application of the theory in the
specific case properly and reliably executed? It should be noted that it is no longer
considered necessary to establish a consensus of the scientific community, as was
previously the case. Finally, Daubert emphasized that the validity of a scientific
theory is itself always contingent on its falsifiability; i.e., its ability to be refuted
using empirical evidence that can be reviewed by experts (this being the litmus test
of any scientific theory).168
However, these are not the only consequences of Daubert, which finds
greater expression in its practical aspects. It is important to emphasize the
terminology, and the circumstances under which the U.S. Supreme Court handed
down this ruling. The U.S. legal system is a jury system, in which the jurors–12
citizens with no legal background–assume the role of legal fact-finders. The
Daubert tests were issued at a time when concerns were starting to grow–
particularly among conservatives–regarding the ability of the jurors to carry out
their duties as fact-finders in cases that involved complex scientific evidence. In
other words, an examination of the social context of the Daubert ruling shows that
the true question being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court was not, “what is
reliable scientific evidence,” but rather, “what scientific evidence will not confuse
166 CrimA 1620/10 Mezgora v. State of Israel (Dec. 3, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.). The Mezgora ruling came after a series of other Israeli rulings
that had already partially incorporated the American precedent; among others, CrimC 76/93 (BS),
State of Israel v. Suleiman El-Abid (n.d.) (Isr.); CrimC 73/95 (BS), State of Israel v. Cohen (2004)
(Isr.); CrimA 9742/02 (BS), Abu Hamad v. State of Israel (n.d.) (Isr.) [hereinafter the Abu Hamad
Case]; SCrimC 1154/05 (TA), State of Israel v Schwartz (n.d.) (Isr.).
167 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–95 (1993). The Israeli court is
not the only one to have adopted the Daubert ruling. See the ruling of the Canadian Supreme
Court in R. v. J.-L.J., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 600, 615–16 (Can.); R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 20–23
(Can.).
168 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95. The Israeli court has upheld the principles of Daubert on
many occasions, with the same questions posed above being asked in the Abu Hamad case as well.
See Abu Hamad Case, supra, note 166.
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the jurors, who are already predisposed to show sympathy in proceedings involving
mass-torts.” The Daubert ruling determined that the judge is to act as a
“gatekeeper” to prevent unreliable or irrelevant scientific evidence from being
presented before the jury. Thus, the question investigated by Daubert is not the
reliability of the scientific evidence itself, but the reliability of the evidence in the
context of concerns over the ability of the jurors to properly valuate the evidence.169
As such, this same significance that applied to the Daubert ruling is equally
relevant to our case, with respect to the submission of an expert opinion in the field
of technology. As illustrated above, we argue with all due caution–as far as
technological matters are concerned and particularly, as far as the ability to forge
digital evidence is concerned, a professional judge is no different from a jury.
Therefore, pursuant to the foregoing, our proposal can be understood as
requiring the submission of an expert opinion as a prerequisite for submitting
digital evidence. Such opinion must meet the tests set forth in Daubert, including
with respect to its methods being generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community (in our case the computer engineering and software communities), and
being falsifiable through the submission of a counter-opinion.
We wish to emphasize that not only is this proposed solution appropriate
on the material level, it is also the appropriate solution on the procedural level,
since by involving technological experts for the purposes of proving technological
matters, we negate the concern that the lawyer of any party to the proceeding
might avoid investigating the issue of authenticity of the evidence. Accordingly, we
negate the risk of the power dynamics between the parties being exacerbated, as
we noted above, by the adversarial system that prevails in Israel. Moreover, and if
this were not enough, we should reiterate that we are, effectively, adding an
additional link to the evidentiary chain, a link that may eliminate the doubt as to
the reliability of the evidence–and thus, the guilt assigned to the defendant on
account of such evidence.170
We should note that we anticipate a further, tangential advantage to this
approach: that the adoption of our proposal might lead to a “chilling effect” on
litigants with respect to attaching photos, since the requirement to attach an
expert opinion would now render this a more costly option for litigants. We believe
this will have a positive outcome. Now litigants who are hesitant as to the veracity
of their photo evidence, or who don’t believe the images will assist in their claim,
may choose not to make use of them on account of the built-in cost associated with
the required expert opinion–a cost unlikely, under those circumstances, to be
recovered. Thus, we find ourselves in a situation in which the costs associated with
this requirement provide an incentive for the parties to economically streamline
their claims,171 perhaps even to the point that the parties will only attach images
whose authenticity and utility are beyond doubt.

169 Or, as Menashe has coined it: the relationship between the probative value of the evidence
and its prejudicial effect (and, accordingly, potential for evidentiary damage). See e.g., Menashe,
supra note 122, at 126–28.
170 As an aside, and for the sake of illustration, it is worth mentioning the matter of Roman
Zadorov, in which the prosecution presented a shoe-print as being that of the defendant, without
so much as attaching an expert opinion. Now, following an enormous public outcry nationwide, it
would appear that the authorities’ failure to attach an expert opinion regarding this shoe-print
has deeply harmed the public trust in them, and the general sentiment of confidence in Roman
Zadorov’s guilt. On the connection between the lack of an expert opinion regarding the shoe-print
and the Zadorov case, see Doron Menashe & Eyal Gruner, Was There a Mistake? (Nevo Pub’g,
2021).
171 See Sanchirico, supra, note 90 (discussing the use of evidence law for economic purposes).

